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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OVERVIEW
Constitutional law has assumed a new, personalized dimen-
sion for American citizens in recent years as litigants increasingly
have availed themselves of federal statutes designed to provide
remedies for infringements of constitutionally based guarantees.,
This trend toward vindicating civil rights in the courts reflects
the evolving socio-legal consciousness of the country and its con-
current emphasis on the protection of individual liberties. It is
not surprising then that approximately half of the cases consid-
ered herein are statutory claims for the enforcement of civil
rights. These cases are discussed in sections II and III below.
While there is a growing tendency to assert equal protection
claims by means of statutorily based actions, the Tenth Circuit
also had occasion to decide several claims of a more traditionally
"constitutional" nature. The decisions reviewed in section I all
deal in some way or another with due process claims based di-
rectly on the fifth or fourteenth amendments.' Finally, cases
which consider the application of constitutional principles to
"specially situated"3 groups of litigants are discussed in section
IV.
I. DIRECT CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
A. Due Process-Obscenity Trials: United States v. Friedman'
In 1970 Friedman was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1970)
with transporting an obscene book' in interstate commerce for the
purpose of sale and distribution. Three years later the defendant
appealed his conviction and the case was remanded to the trial
court.' Retried under constitutional guidelines newly articulated
See note 46 infra.
The issue of state immunity from suit in federal court under the eleventh amend-
ment was raised in Green v. Utah, 539 F.2d 1266 (10th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of this
case and the eleventh amendment claim raised therein, see the Securities Overview infra.
See note 130 infra.
528 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1976).
The dominant theme of the book, The Animal Lovers, was sexual relations between
human beings and animals.
, United States v. Friedman, 488 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1973). See 52 DEN. L.J. 81, 81
n.4 (1975).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California,7
Friedman was reconvicted and again appealed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit. Friedman claimed that, since the offense charged occurred
before the Supreme Court decision in Miller, he should have been
retried under the standard existing prior to that decision.8 ,
The Tenth Circuit rejected the appeal on two grounds. First,
the court held that Friedman had in effect been convicted by two
juries-one utilizing the old obscenity standard, and another
employing the Miller test. Therefore, the court reasoned, this
defendant had been accorded more than the requisite due pro-
cess.' Second, the court questioned whether Friedman had ever
been entitled to be tried under the old standard since the test
enunciated there had been formulated by a mere plurality of the
Court. The Tenth Circuit noted that plurality opinions are not
binding on lower courts. 0 The court concluded that Friedman
therefore never had a right to expect that he would be tried under
7 413 U.S. 15 (1973). On June 21, 1973 the Supreme Court decided four cases in
addition to Miller, all dealing with the issue of obscenity: Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft.
Reels of Super 8 mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139
(1973). Led by Miller, these cases established a new standard by which to judge obscenity.
See note 8 infra.
The pre-Miller standard that Friedman urged the court to apply developed out of
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth held that "obscenity is not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech or press." Id. at 485. Nine years later in Memoirs
v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), the Court "clarified" its position by attempting to
articulate a definition of obscenity. A plurality opinion held that for something to be
obscene:
[Ilt must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to
the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is
utterly without redeeming social value.
383 U.S. at 418.
In Miller the Court specifically rejected this test, and adopted the following formula-
tion:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
528 F.2d at 788.




the old standard. Noting that the book in question "would be
considered obscene under any standard. . . even those of ancient
Sodom and Gomorrah,"" the court affirmed the conviction.
B. Due Process-Property Rights
1. "Welfare" benefits: Ryan v. Shea
2
This class action, 3 brought on behalf of certain recipients of
Colorado Aid to the Needy Disabled (AND), challenged on due
process grounds the constitutionality of procedures whereby wel-
fare benefits were terminated. Under an act passed by Congress
in 1972 and later amended," state AND recipients who were re-
ceiving benefits in December 1973, and who had comenced receiv-
ing such benefits before June 1, 1973, would presumptively be
eligible for benefits under an analogous federal program that was
designed to replace the individual state programs beginning Jan-
uary 1, 1974.'1 Plaintiffs were individuals who were receiving state
AND benefits in December 1973, but who had not commenced
receiving these benefits by June 1, 1973. Realizing that limiting
presumptive eligibility in this manner might result in overly
harsh consequences, Congress amended the law to provide that
pending individual eligibility determinations, recipients in plain-
tiffs' class would continue to receive presumptive benefits for up
to one year after the effective date of the federal program.'"
The program became effective and plaintiffs began receiving
presumptive benefits. Later, an eligibility determination was
made upon the basis of a "paper review" of records maintained
under the state AND program. 7 If ineligibility was established by
1 528 F.2d at 789 (citing United States v. Marks, 520 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1975), where
the Sixth Circuit similarly held that a film was obscene under both the Memoirs and
Miller test).
1 525 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1975).
'" For a discussion of the class action elements of this law suit see Federal Practice
and Procedure Overview infra.
' Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, tit. I, § 301, 86 Stat. 1465, 42 U.S.C. §
1381 (Supp. II 1972), as amended by Act of Dec. 31, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 9, 87 Stat.
957, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c (Supp. IV 1974). Both the Act and its amendment became effective
January 1, 1974.
"3 The federal program was Supplemental Security Income for Aged, Blind, and
Disabled (SSI).
' Act of Mar. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-256, § 1, 88 Stat. 52.
* This review was conducted without plaintiffs being given notice or an opportunity
to be heard. 525 F.2d at 271.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
this review, benefits were summarily terminated. Then and only
then were individuals who had been terminated given the oppor-
tunity to have a full hearing on the question of eligibility. The
question raised was whether plaintiffs were constitutionally enti-
tled to a hearing before their presumptive benefits could be termi-
nated.
The court, reaching the merits,'8 determined that the con-
trolling issue was whether plaintiffs' interest in the presumptive
payments fell within the protection of the rule announced in
Goldberg v. Kelly. "9 There the Supreme Court held that under the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, state welfare
benefits could not be terminated before the recipient had been
accorded an "adequate" evidentiary hearing. 20 The interest that
a recipient had in his benefits was, therefore, held to merit proce-
dural safeguards under the due process clause. Defendants
argued that plaintiffs' interest in presumptive benefits was not as
great as that of a recipient whose individual eligibility had al-
ready been established.2' After examining the legislative history
and applicable administrative procedures in depth, the court re-
jected defendants' argument and held that the constitutional in-
terest involved was substantially similar to the one discussed in
Goldberg. 2 2 Noting that the majority of federal courts which have
considered this issue have reached the same conclusion, 23 the
Tenth Circuit affirmmed the district court's order granting plain-
tiffs a permanent injunction against the administrators of the SSI
program.
2. Athletics: Albach v. Odle 
4
The central issue in this case was whether participation in
interscholastic public high school athletics is a constitutionally
protected civil right. Appellant Albach attacked certain rules
11 For a discussion of the jurisdictional questions raised by this case, see Federal
Practice and Procedure Overview infra.
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Id. at 261.
525 F.2d at 272-74.
' Id. at 274.
Id. See, e.g., Buckles v. Weinberger, 387 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Brown v.
Weinberger, 382 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Md. 1974) (citing unpublished opinions), aff'd per
curiam, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
24 531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976).
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adopted by the New Mexico Activities Association. Under these
rules Albach was automatically barred from interscholastic com-
petition for one year. 5 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal on the ground that the case failed to raise a
substantial federal question. In doing so, the court found control-
ling its earlier decision in Oklahoma High School Athletic Asso-
ciation v. Bray.26 There, the Tenth Circuit had held that a contro-
versy between a public school and a state athletic association over
the question of whether the school might compete in interscholas-
tic athletics did not present a justiciable federal question.
The court in Albach conceded that under certain circum-
stances public high school athletic regulations might have to
withstand constitutional scrutiny. Such might be the case where
a regulation operated to deprive a student of a specific right guar-
anteed by the constitution.27 However, the court refused to hold
that mere participation amounted to a constitutionally protected
property interest. 8 The court ruled that since no specific consti-
21 The pertinent rule barred from competition "any student who transferred from his
home district to a boarding school or from a boarding school to his home district." Id. at
984.
" 321 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1963). Accord, Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic
Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1973).
27 See Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (alienage discrimina-
tion); Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. St. Augustine High School, 396 F.2d 224
(5th Cir. 1968) (racial discrimination); Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972)
(invasion of marital privacy); Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258
(D. Neb. 1972) (sex discrimination).
' The court considered and rejected the argument that Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1974), in some way overruled Bray. In Goss the Supreme Court held that under Ohio law
a student had a property interest in his public education sufficient to require a due process
hearing before he could be suspended. 419 U.S. at 574. In Goss the Court spoke in terms
of the "educational process." Id. at 576. The Tenth Circuit, seizing upon the phrase, read
Goss as protecting only against a deprivation of the whole "educational process." Athletic
participation was characterized as only one of the innumerable components, not in itself
protected, which made up such a process. 531 F.2d at 985.
The position taken by the court in Albach was recently cited with approval by the
federal district court in Colorado Seminary [University of Denver] v. NCAA, 417 F.
Supp. 885, 895 (D. Colo. 1976). There the university, a member of the NCAA, refused to
abide by an NCAA ruling which declared certain students ineligible to play hockey. The
NCAA thereupon placed all university teams on probation. The university contended that
it had been denied due process. Attempting to distinguish Bray, the university argued that
the relationship between a college athlete and his institution was fundamentally different
than the one between a public high school and its student athletes. The court noted that
while withdrawal of a previously granted collegiate scholarship might invoke due process
protections, no such deprivation had been shown. Id. Further, in accord with Bray, the
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tutional right was at stake, "supervision and regulation of high
school athletic programs remain within the discretion of appro-
priate state boards, and are not within federal cognizance under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 .... 29
C. Due Process-Procedural Rights: United States v. Marines
3
At the trial level, Marines 3' pled guilty to a charge of posses-
sion of marijuana and was sentenced to one year imprisonment.
On appeal of his sentence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed and Mar-
ines petitioned for rehearing. On rehearing Marines raised two
constitutional issues: (1) whether disposition of his appeal pur-
suant to Rules 8(d) and 9(d), Rules of Court for the Tenth Cir-
cuit, 32 denied him his fifth amendment right to due process; and
district court rejected the contention that participation in college athletic programs, be-
cause of its relationship to later employment in professional athletics, was sufficient to
give plaintiffs a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. Id. See also Parish v.
NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1034 n.17 (5th Cir. 1975).
However, not all courts agree with this position. At least as far as college athletics
are concerned, one federal district court has specifically held that before athletes can be
suspended from a team they must be afforded a due process hearing. Behagen v. Intercol-
legiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972). That
same court had stated that "the opportunity to participate in intercollegiate basketball
...is a property right entitled to due process guarantees because it may . . . lead to a
very remunerative career in professional basketball and, because . . . it is an important
part of the student athlete's educational experience." Regents of Univ. Minn. v. NCAA,
No. 4-76-Civ.-468 at 7 (D. Minn., filed Dec. 2, 1976) (order granting temporary injunc-
tion). See McDonald v. NCAA, 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Hunt v. NCAA, No.
G-76-370-CA (W.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 1976). Compare the language in Goss, 419 U.S. at 576
("educational process") with the court's formulation in Regents of Univ. of Minn., No. 4-
76-Civ.-468 at 7 ("educational experience"). Therefore, it would seem that while partici-
pation in public high school athletics does not in itself rise to the level of a constitutionally
protected right, there is some question as to whether that is the case when participation
in collegiate athletics is at issue.
" 531 F.2d at 985.
- 535 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 The criminal law aspects of Marines are discussed in the Criminal Law Overview
infra.
S10TH Cm. R. 8 provides:
(c) The appellant shall have 15 days from the date of receipt of the motion
to dismiss or affirm within which to file a response opposing the motion,
addressing the merits. Such response, together with three copies and proof
of service, shall be filed with the clerk. Upon the filing of such response, or
the expiration of the time allowed therefor, the record on appeal, together
with the motion and response, shall be distributed by the clerk to the court
for its consideration. The time for filing briefs shall be tolled pending the
disposition of the motion to dismiss or affirm.
(d) After consideration of the papers distributed pursuant to the foregoing
VOL. 54
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(2) whether designating the opinion which affirmed Marines' con-
viction as "not for routine publication," pursuant to Circuit Rule
17,33 violated his rights under the fifth and sixth amendments, as
well as denying him equal access to the courts.
The court summarily dismissed the latter claim, stating that
the court was "aware of no constitutional right to have an opinion
published. Counsel for Marines is apparently laboring under a
misapprehension that opinions designated 'not for routine publi-
cation' may not be cited."'" Of somewhat more interest, however,
was Marines' final claim-that assignment of his appeal to a
court calendar providing for summary review based on written
memoranda and without oral argument violated his due process
rights under the fifth amendment.3 5 The court met this objection
paragraph, or on its own motion after notice to the parties, the court will
enter an appropriate order.
Whenever the court, after reviewing an appeal, concludes that manifest
error requires reversal or vacation of a judgment or order of the district court,
or remand for additional proceedings, the court may enter an appropriate
order after notice to the parties.
10TH Cm. R. 9(d) provides:
Calendar D cases shall consist of those cases in which a motion to affirm
or dismiss has been filed pursuant to Rule 8(a) of these Rules and those in
which notice has been given pursuant to Rule 8(d) of these Rules that the
court is considering summary action on its own motion.
(1) Within 15 days after receiving notice that the court is considering sum-
mary action pursuant to Rule 8(d) on its own motion, the appellant may file
in quadruplicate and serve on all parties to the appeal a memorandum
addressing the merits, opposing such summary action.
(2) The appellee may simultaneously file in quadruplicate and serve on all
parties to the appeal a memorandum addressing the merits supporting sum-
mary action.
(3) The same procedure and form as the preceding two paragraphs will be
followed in those cases where manifest error is noted by the court pursuant
to Rule 8(d), except that the appellee may oppose and the appellant may
support summary action.
10rH CIR. R. 17 provides in pertinent part:
(c) The court or a panel thereof will determine when an opinion shall be
published and will direct the clerk accordingly. The direction will appear on
the face of the opinion. Unpublished opinions, although unreported and not
uniformly available to all of the parties, can nevertheless be cited, if rele-
vant, in proceedings before this or any other court. Counsel citing same shall
serve a copy of the unpublished opinion upon opposing counsel.
31 535 F.2d at 555.
1 The court commented that the most noteworthy consequence of assignment to the
"summary calendar" D related to briefing. Full briefing is allowed under any other court
calendar, whereas parties whose cases are assigned to calendar D may only submit memo-
randa which must be filed within 15 days after receipt of notice that the case has been
1977
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by reciting the well-established rule that dispensing with oral
arguments does not violate due process.36 Therefore, the petition
was denied since it failed to allege that the defendant had been
prejudiced by any time strictures which the rule placed on his
attorney.37
D. Due Process-Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: United
States v. Hansen Niederhauser Co.38
The primary constitutional question presented by this case
was whether, based upon the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, a corporate officer could refuse to comply with
an administrative summons requesting him to produce corporate
records. Additionally, the court considered whether appellant
Niederhauser was denied due process of law when the district
court held him in contempt for refusing to produce the records in
question.
Niederhauser had been issued a summons by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), 31 which was seeking corporate records to
determine tax liability. In reply, Niederhauser stated that he did
not know where the records were, and that even if he did, he
would refuse to produce them. On appeal of the contempt order,
the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the principle that neither a corpora-
tion nor a corporate officer could assert a privilege against self-
assigned to that calendar. However, these memoranda are not limited with respect to
either length or content. 535 F.2d at 555-56.
1 Id. at 556 (citing Federal Communications Comm'n v. WJR, The Good Will Sta-
tion, Inc., 337 U.S. 265 (1949); United States v. Smith, 484 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974)). See also George W.B. Bryson & Co. v. Norton Lilly & Co.,
502 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Local 42, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & F.I. & A. Workers,
476 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnson, 466 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1111 (1973).
" Had Marines asserted prejudice due to any time limitations arbitrarily placed on
his attorney, he might have been able to state a sixth amendment claim based on denial
of effective assistance of counsel. See Fields v. Payton, 375 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967);
Garland v. Cox, 311 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D. Va. 1970). However, no such claim was made
here.
522 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1975).
" The court noted that the validity of such a summons has consistently been upheld
by the Supreme Court. Id. at 1039. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971);
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v.
Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). Similarly, in the recent case of Elliot v. Bratton, No. 75-
1713 (10th Cir., April 16, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication), the Tenth Circuit upheld,
against a fourth and fifth amendment-based attack, the validity of an IRS summons
ordering the production of bank records.
VOL. 54
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incrimination relative to corporate records."° The privilege
against self-incrimination has historically been considered a per-
sonal privilege, applicable only to an individual's words or per-
sonal papers." The other circuits considering this question have
reached the same conclusion.'"
Niederhauser's due process argument was based on his al-
leged inability to produce the records. He reasoned that the court
could not hold him in contempt for failing to perform an impossi-
ble act.43 The IRS had offered to make a showing at the contempt
hearing of the existence of the requested documents. However,
the district court elected to proceed without this evidence. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that to satisfy the requirements
of due process there had to be at least "some showing regarding
the existence of the records."" The case was remanded for the
required evidentiary hearing.
I1. STATUTORY CLAIMS: STATE ACTION
AND 42 U.S.C. § 19830
A. Essential Elements- Generally
In recent years section 1983 has become a frequently used
weapon in the arsenal of civil rights plaintiffs who have litigated
their constitutional claims in the federal courts.' 6 During the pe-
522 F.2d at 1039 (citing Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)).
' See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (collecting cases).
,7 See, e.g., Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1968); Hair Indus., Ltd.
v. United States, 340 F.2d 510 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
,1 United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950) announced the frequently cited rule
that one charged with contempt for failing to comply with a court order makes a complete
defense by proving that he is unable to comply. However, if the one so charged is responsi-
ble for the unavailability of documents in question, he cannot invoke the general rule in
his own behalf. Id. at 330-31.
522 F.2d at 1040.
,5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Although enacted by Congress more than a century ago, section 1983 was infre-
quently invoked until relatively recent times. From 1871 to 1920 claims under section 1983
were raised in only 21 reported cases. 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABR & N. DORSEN, PoLmCAL
AND CIVL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1447 (3d ed. 1967). Then, in Monroe v. Pape, 365
1977
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riod covered by this survey the Tenth Circuit had occasion to
dismiss two appeals by cursorily reviewing the necessary ele-
ments of a section 1983 claim. These cases state the minimum
requirements for a section 1983 action.
In Ward v. Baca47 appellant Ward brought a section 1983
action alleging that a United States marshal had acted to deprive
him of his constitutional rights to counsel, bail, and a prompt
arraignment. The Tenth Circuit, reviewing the district court's
dismissal, held: "It is axiomatic that for an action brought pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be valid, two elements are necessary:
1) constitutional rights must be violated and 2) the constitutional
deprivation must be caused by actions of those acting under color
of state law.""' The sole defendant in Ward was a federal officer
acting under federal law. Therefore, the second essential element
was not present and the trial court's order accordingly was af-
firmed.
In Block v. Schaefer" the question of state action was again
at issue. Appellee Schaefer had reperfected a prior lien upon
Block's truck and had sold the truck to satisfy the lien. Block
brought a section 1983 action alleging that she had been deprived
of her property without due process of law. Without reaching the
question of whether Block's due process rights had been violated,
the court affirmed the district court's order for summary judg-
ment in favor of Schaefer on the ground that no state action was
involved. The court noted that before an individual can be
deemed an agent for purposes of fulfilling the state action require-
U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme Court held that a claim under section 1983 was stated when
plaintiffs alleged that Chicago police officers wrongfully broke into their home. Since that
time section 1983 has seen continued growth in its importance as a basis for litigation. In
1960, approximately 300 "civil rights" actions were filed, while in fiscal 1972 approxi-
mately 8,000 such actions were brought. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3573, at 487 (1975). See Kates, Liability of Public Entities
Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131 (1972); McCormack,
Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional
Protections, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 250 (1974); Note, Damages Under § 1983: The School
Context, 46 IND. L.J. 521 (1971); Note, Civil Rights Act Section 1983: Abuses by Law
Enforcement Officers, 36 IND. L.J. 317 (1961); Note, Developing Governmental Liability
Under 42 US.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1201 (1971); Note, Constitutional Torts: Section
1983 Redress for the Deprived Debtor, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 627 (1973).
No. 75-1818 (10th Cir., June 24, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
" Id. at 2.
" No. 75-1836 (10th Cir., July 1, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
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ment under section 1983, the party must have the authority to act
officially for the state.50 The Tenth Circuit held that Schaefer had
been advancing only his own private interest, and had in no way
been representing the state.'
The four cases discussed below present somewhat more deli-
cate variations on the questions raised in Ward and Block. They
demonstrate that while the essential elements of a cause of action
under the provision may appear obvious, subtle and ofttimes
complex questions arise when the stated requirements are applied
to differing fact situations.
B. School Annexation: Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 53 v. Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 5252
School District No. 53 (Crooked Oak) brought a section 1983
action against adjoining School District No. 52 (Midwest), chal-
lenging the validity of a 1971 deannexation election. The election,
held valid in two Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions,53 resulted
in the transfer of certain territory in Crooked Oak to Midwest.
Crooked Oak asserted that it had an affirmative constitutional
obligation to protect its integrated school system, and that the
transfer had dismantled that system and had created a segre-
gated one. Examining the facts, 4 the court of appeals ruled that
the system was integrated both before and after the transfer, and
could be operated as such on a continuing basis. The mere fact
that certain "college preparatory" courses had to be eliminated
10 Id. at 5. While the requirement for state action in a section 1983 case has generated
a large body of law, the particular standard used by the court in Block is known as the
"badge of authority" test. It developed from Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) where
the Court said: "Congress has the power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some
capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it." 365 U.S. at
171-72 (emphasis added). See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. Mai"a, & E. CooPaa, supra note 46, §
3573, at 491.
" No. 75-1836 at 5.
' 532 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1976).
11 Austin v. State Bd. of Educ., 497 P.2d 218 (Okla. 1972) (directing Oklahoma school
officials to implement the deannexation); Haller v. Austin, 487 P.2d 1360 (Okla. 1971)
(approving the election procedures used).
' Rejecting the contention, the court noted that prior to the transfer Crooked Oak
had a black enrollment of approximately 20%. After the deannexation this figure increased
to approximately 42%. Numerically, Midwest had received 1,361 students of whom 70
were black. 532 F.2d at 732.
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from the curriculum in Crooked Oak did not raise the problem
to a constitutional level. However, the outcome might have been
different had it been shown that students who desired these
courses had been denied transfers to other districts where such
courses were available.55
Ruling that no constitutional right had been infringed, the
Tenth Circuit went on to hold that the transfer had not resulted
from any state action. The court found that the election had been
brought about solely by the efforts of codefendants-appellants
Austin and Parker, who were private parties. They alone had
circulated petitions calling for the election. The court acknowl-
edged the principle that one need not be a state officer to act
"under color of law" if one willfully participates in a joint activity
with the state or its agent." Yet here the state had not fostered
the election. Indeed, county officials had fought (and lost) court
battles in attempts to invalidate the elections." Under these
facts, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of Midwest.
C. Election Filing Fees: Gallagher v. Evans"
Appellants, who were candidates for various state offices in
a 1972 New Mexico election, brought suit under section 1983
seeking restitution of primary election filing fees which they had
paid under protest. The issue presented to the court was the
constitutionality of a New Mexico statute"9 requiring certain can-
Id. at 733. The only analogous case seems to be Hart v. Community School Bd.,
383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 497 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 512
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). There, the district court was faced with the task of desegregating
an identifiably black school. Judge Weinstein held that such a school's curriculum "must
be arranged so that pupils transferring into the school have at least as good an education
as they would have been afforded without the change." Id. at 757. The Tenth Circuit has
skirted the issue of decreased quality in education addressed in Hart by implying the
possibility of transferring students interested in taking courses now unavailable at
Crooked Oak.
" 532 F.2d at 733.
' See Austin v. State Bd. of Educ., 497 P.2d 218 (Okla. 1972); Haller v. Austin, 487
P.2d 1360 (Okla. 1971).
- 536 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1976).
1969 N.M. Laws, ch. 240, § 176 (repealed 1973) (current version at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 3-8-26 (Supp. 1975). The current version sets an across-the-board fee of $50 for all
candidates, except those for county offices, who pay $5. The repealed provision proved a
fertile source of litigation. See, e.g., Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.M. 1972);




didates to pay filing fees determined by a percentage of the salary
of the particular position sought. In 1972 a federal district court
had held part of that statute unconstitutional as applied to candi-
dates for the United States Senate 0 In Gallagher, the Tenth
Circuit relied heavily on that decision, holding that "[t]he con-
struction of a constitutional provision must be uniform. . . . All
the candidates should be treated the same."'" Thus, the court
ruled that treating other candidates differently from United
States Senatorial candidates would in itself amount to a denial
of equal protection."2
D. Teacher Firings: Mogle v. Sevier County School District
63
Mogel brought this civil rights action when the school at
which he had been employed refused to renew his contract. The
trial court granted summary judgment against Mogle on the
' Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F. Supp. 729 (D.N.M. 1972). The court struck down the
provision as violative of equal protection. Under the contested provision, the filing fee
required of a United States senatorial candidate was $2,550. Id. at 730.
" 536 F.2d at 902. While the result in Gallagher is arguably correct, the analysis is
questionable. The court here was dealing with a statutory provision. The "uniform appli-
cation" argument advanced in the majority opinion, while not often employed, relates in
theory to constitutional provisions. See 1 T. CooLEY, CONSTIrTTONAL LImrrATIONS 123-24
(8th ed. 1927). The mere fact that the statute had previously been found unconstitutional
as applied does not necessarily require the law to be voided in all subsequent cases.
Further, the court held that the 1972 federal district court decision in Fiorina constituted
a "change in conditions" justifying the outcome reached in Gallagher. 536 F.2d at 902.
The court implied that because of this "change" the statute, which might have been valid
at one time, was now invalid. Id. While the doctrine of "changed conditions" has at times
been invoked when economic and social realities have shifted, no case cited by the Tenth
Circuit in Gallagher supports the extension of the doctrine to the point where a prior
decision of a court in a different case could serve as a changed condition justifying a later
holding. "Changed conditions" such as these are more correctly called "precedents."
62 The court was therefore able to ignore whether the filing fee requirement was
reasonable. This issue, as the concurring opinion points out, may not have been so easy
to decide given the rather unusual history of New Mexico election practices. Judge Bar-
rett, quoting a prior New Mexico election case, wrote:
New Mexico political history and legislative attempts to regulate elec-
tions are fascinating subjects. Three percent filing fees have been tried but
found wanting. The modest expenditure was not sufficient to preclude the
filing of "stooge" candidates. In New Mexico parlance, a "stooge candidate"
is one who is filed by, or whose filing is caused or procured by a candidate
or his adherents with a view to dividing the vote which would presumably
be garnered by his opponent. Such efforts often developed along ethnic lines.
536 F.2d at 902-03 (Barrett, J., concurring)(quoting State ex rel. Apodaca v. Fiorina, 495
P.2d 1379, 1382 (N.M. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 935 (1974) (upholding the validity of
the percentage fee system)).
-3 540 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1976).
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ground that no substantial federal question was raised. On appeal
the Tenth Circuit held that a substantial federal question was
presented, but that on the facts summary judgment was nonethe-
less proper. Hence, the judgment was affirmed.
Mogle had accepted a position as counselor at North Sevier
High School in Utah for the 1969-70 school year. At the time,
Mogle lived outside of the school district. Upon being hired, he
was told that at some time he should move closer to the school.
However, this was not stated as a condition precedent to his
employment. Mogle did not move, and when contracts were being
negotiated for the 1972-73 school year he was notified that his
contract would not be renewed unless he were living in the North
Sevier area by the first day of school. Despite a good faith effort,
Mogle was unable to find housing. The school, requiring teachers
to be residents of the school district in which they taught, refused
to renew the contract. After mediation efforts proved fruitless this
action was brought."
Two constitutional issues were raised. First, Mogle asserted
that imposing a residency requirement on only one class of em-
ployees denied him equal protection. Second, he argued that the
residency requirement violated his right to due process by creat-
ing a conclusive and irrebuttable presumption that he could not
satisfactorily perform his job unless he was a resident of the
school district.
Discussing the equal protection claim, the court first consid-
ered what standard of review was to be applied to the residency
requirement. The court reasoned that strict scrutiny was inappro-
priate and the "continuing residency" requirements should be
subjected to the less demanding standards of the traditional ra-
tional relationship test. 5 The court's decision in this regard was
" The action was brought under not only section 1983 but also 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(1970), which provides in pertinent part that an action will lie against
two or more persons in any State or Territory [who] conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
law ....
The conspiracy element of this provision was not reached by the court in Mogle as the
case was decided on the issues of whether Mogle had been deprived of either equal protec-
tion or due process of law.
Recent Supreme Court holdings differentiate between requirements of "continuing
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based primarily upon the Supreme Court's holding in McCarthy
v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission."5 There, in a per cur-
iam opinion, the Court applied a rational relationship test and
upheld a municipal regulation requiring city employees to reside
within city limits.
Having decided upon the appropriate standard of review, the
court in Mogle found the residency requirement did not violate
the equal protection clause. The court noted the justifications
advanced for the policy and held that they were "not wholly
unsubstantial."" With this holding the Tenth Circuit went a long
way towards suggesting that almost any continuing residency re-
quirement for public employment will withstand an equal protec-
tion attack."
Turning to Mogle's due process claim," the court took pains
to distinguish the facts here from the two leading cases on the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine, Cleveland Board of Educa-
residency" (where to keep a job an individual must reside in a defined locale) and "dura-
tional residency" requirements (where one must reside in a defined area for a certain
length of time before being able to do an act or receive a benefit). McCarthy v. Philadel-
phia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 425 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam). See Detroit Police Officer's
Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 405 U.S. 950 (1972), dismissing for want of substantial federal
question 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97 (1971). Only measures involving "durational
requirements," affecting the fundamental right to interstate travel, have been held subject
to strict scrutiny. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). One circuit
court under facts almost identical to those in Mogle has gone so far as to flatly declare
that cases involving the right to intrastate travel do not require the application of the strict
scrutiny test. Warwell v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist., 529 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1976).
424 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam).
540 F.2d at 484. School superintendents, in affidavits, sought to justify the policy
on the grounds that counselors above all other school employees should be readily accessi-
ble to students, parents, community and school officials; that certain services were not
being provided students because the counselor lived outside the attendance area; that it
was difficult for students and parents to become personally acquainted with the coun-
selor under such conditions; that because of "folkways and mores" it was more difficult
for a counselor living outside the district to become acquainted with the community where
his students lived; and that career opportunities were not as readily discoverable by one
living outside the school district. Id. at 485-86.
0 See note 65 supra.
" After Mogle had been filed, the Tenth Circuit decided Weathers v. West Yuma
School Dist., 530 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1976). There, the court held that a non-tenured
teacher did not have a property or liberty interest in his employment protected by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. After Weathers was decided Mogle
dropped some of his due process claims, but the court still chose to note the irrebuttable
presumption argument-perhaps because it had never been addressed in this context. See
540 F.2d at 483 n.4.
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tion v. LaFleur7" and Vlandis v. Kline.7 The court noted that in
LaFleur and Vlandis the presumptions involved were
"unwarranted and a denial of due process" whereas in Mogle it
had not been shown that the residency requirement involved a
presumption against the plaintiff "on any particular point. ' '1 2
The Tenth Circuit relied upon the recent Supreme Court case of
Weinberger v. Salfi3 for the proposition that the doctrine con-
cerning irrebuttable presumptions should not be applied when it
would clash with a formal policy developed through the legisla-
tive process.7' Evidently the court thought that even an informal,
unwritten school board policy should be able to include
"reasonable" conclusive presumptions regarding residency.
E. Access to the Courts: Silver v. Cormier75
This case presented a novel claim under section 1983. The
gravamen of the complaint was that Cormier, acting under color
of state law, had deprived Silver of his due process right of free
access to the courts. Silver had sold land to the Denver Urban
Renewal Authority (DURA), which had announced its intention
to demolish a building located upon the property. Contrary to
this announcement, however, DURA resold the property for a
substantial profit. When Silver informed DURA that he was
going to bring suit based on these facts, Cormier threatened to
withhold from Silver a $10,000 going-out-of-business allowance to
which Silver was statutorily entitled. Due to these threats, Silver
delayed in enforcing his right to the monies due. Finally, he
brought suit under section 1983. In addressing the constitutional
claim, the court stated:
Access to the courts of the United States is a constitutional right
guaranteed by the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
70 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (school board requirement that all pregnant teachers take
forced maternity leave by fourth month held unconstitutional).
" 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (irrebuttable presumption that college student who had main-
tained out-of-state address at any time during previous year was out-of-state resident for
tuition purposes held unconstitutional).
72 540 F.2d at 485.
422 U.S. 749 (1976).
7, 540 F.2d at 485. However, the evidence in Mogle would suggest that the presump-
tion established there was not the result of a thorough legislative process, but rather was
an ad hoc informal determination made by a single individual-the school superintend-
ent. Id. at 484.
'5 529 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1976).
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amendments. This right of access to the courts cannot be infringed
upon or burdened. A public official's threats to a citizen to withhold
monies due and owing, should legal proceedings on an independent
matter be instituted, burdens or chills constitutional rights of access
to the courts. 6
III. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: TITLE Vii
AND RELATED CLAIMS7"
During the period covered by this survey the Tenth Circuit
considered a number of cases involving charges of racial discrimi-
16 529 F.2d at 163. The only cases which the Tenth Circuit cited as authority for its
holding were criminal cases which had never previously been extended into the civil area.
These criminal cases generally rest upon the principle that "prison officials may not un-
reasonably hamper inmates in gaining access to the courts." Evans v. Mosley, 455 F.2d
1084, 1087 (10th Cir. 1972). See Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973); Harbolt
v. Alldredge, 464 F.2d 1243 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972); Sigafus v.
Brown, 416 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1969); DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1966); Hatfield
v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961). However, in Silver, the Tenth Circuit took a
giant step in extending this rationale into the civil area. Such an extension is unprece-
dented, for the criminal cases are all linked by the fact that plaintiffs were inmates under
virtually total control of prison officials. In Silver, the plaintiff was a sophisticated, unin-
carcerated businessman, free to communicate with lawyers, and to bring as many law suits
as he desired.
There are some "free access" cases in the area of civil litigation. Yet they deal literally
with free access. The landmark case of Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), allowed
indigent divorce litigants to file their case without paying the regular court fees. Some
courts interpreted Boddie to presage an evolving rule favorable to indigents wishing to
press civil claims. See, e.g., Bacon v. Graham, 348 F. Supp. 996 (D. Ariz. 1972); O'Brien
v. Trevethan, 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972). However, in United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434 (1973), the Supreme Court made it clear that Boddie was to be narrowly con-
strued and applied only in the few situations where (1) only a court could resolve the
conflict involved; and (2) where the issue in dispute was found to be "fundamental." Id.
at 444-45. Thus, neither Boddie and its progeny, nor the line of criminal cases in the free
access area seems to support Silver.
" Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), was specifically
drafted to provide a remedy for those who had suffered the effects of discrimination in
employment. However, Title VII is not an exclusive remedy. Facts which give rise to a
claim under Title VII may also state a cause of action under other statutory provisions
relating to the protection of civil rights, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). But see text accom-
panying note 100 infra. Plaintiffs frequently base claims on these other statutory provi-
sions in addition to Title VII because the scope of remedies available under Title VII is
narrower than that available under other civil rights statutes. Under Title VII, the general
rule is that neither punitive nor consequential damages may be awarded. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Comm'n v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Howard
v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1974). Yet under other civil rights
statutes, punitive or consequential damages may be awarded. See, e.g., Sabol v. Snyder,
524 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1975) (punitive damages awarded in section 1981 claim); McCrary
v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) aff'd on other grounds, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)
(damages for embarrassment, humiliation, and mental anguish granted in section 1981
claim).
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nation, primarily in employment practices. Approximately one-
third of these suits,78 however, was concerned mainly with narrow
procedural questions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.11 Of the remaining cases, five are of particular interest and
are discussed below.
80
A. Hiring: Sabol v. Snyder"'
Plaintiff Sabol, a black practical and registered nurse, ap-
plied for an open position with the Kansas State Board of Educa-
tion. Despite the fact that plaintiff was the only qualified 2 indi-
vidual to submit a timely application, a less qualified white male
who had submitted a late application was offered the job. There-
upon Sabol brought this suit charging racial discrimination in
employment. At the trial level plaintiff was sucessful on her sec-
tion 1981 claim.8 3 On appeal, appellant Snyder's primary conten-
tion was that in light of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green,"' a
Supreme Court decision handed down after Sabol had been
argued, plaintiff had failed to state a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation.
"' These cases, dealing principally with the question of time limits within which Title
VII plaintiffs must file suit, are discussed in the Administrative Law Overview supra.
n 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
14 In addition to those cases discussed in the text, the Tenth Circuit disposed of three
further actions solely on evidentiary grounds: Love v. Philco-Ford Corp., No. 75-1138 (10th
Cir., Aug. 20, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication); Buckley v. Coyle Public School Sys.,
No. 75-1143 (10th Cir., Feb. 6, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication); Collins v. Martin
Marietta Corp., No. 75-1447 (10th Cir., Jan. 21, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
Stanley v. Continental Oil Co., 536 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1976), was dismissed because
of failure on the part of plaintiff-appellant Stanley to prosecute. Stanley had alleged a
violation under Title VII. Continental moved for summary judgment and submitted sup-
porting affidavits. Stanley did not file counter-affidavits as required by court order and
FED. R. Civ. P. 56. The trial court's dismisal was sustained on appeal.
81 524 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1975).
12 In addition to testimony concerning plaintiff's work experience and educational
background, workshop evaluations of plaintiff were admitted into evidence over defen-
dant's objection. These records were admitted under the business records exception to the
hearsay rule, and their admission as such was upheld on appeal. 524 F.2d at 1012.
93 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and no other.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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McDonnell specified the elements needed to establish a
prima facie case in a Title VII action.Y A plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifi-
cations."
The Tenth Circuit concentrated on the last two elements since
the first two were obviously met. Stretching the logic in
McDonnell, the court found that the acceptance of an application
after the announced cutoff date amounted to a rejection of Sabol
even though cutoff dates were not strictly enforced. This
"rejection," coupled with the subsequent hiring of the white male
applicant, satisfied the court that the last two elements of the
McDonnell test had been met. 7 The Tenth Circuit rejected as a
sham appellant's business judgment defense that the white male
was better qualified, and affirmed the trial court judgment grant-
ing Sabol not only actual, but also punitive damages and attor-
ney's fees. 8
B. Hiring and Promotion: Chicano Police Officer's Association
v. Stover"9
The Chicano Police Officer's Association and some of its
members brought this civil rights action 0 alleging discrimination
in both the hiring and promotion procedures used by the Albu-
querque, New Mexico Police Department. The complaint alleged
that the Department utilized discriminatory procedures based
upon criteria not substantially related to job performance, with
" The Tenth Circuit applied the McDonnell-Douglas Title VII standard to Sabol's
section 1981 claim noting that it had previously been so applied. 524 F.2d at 1012. How-
ever, this technique can no longer be used. See text accompanying note 100 infra.
, 411 U.S. at 802 (footnote omitted).
', 524 F.2d at 1012. The Tenth Circuit could have avoided this step in the analysis,
holding that prior rejection was not required in all cases, by relying on a footnote in
McDonnell, where the Court noted that "[tihe facts necessarily will vary in Title VII
cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." 411 U.S. at 802
n.13.
524 F.2d at 1012-13.
U 526 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1975), vacated, 426 U.S. 944 (1976).
* Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 (1970).
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the result that a disproportionate number of Spanish-speaking
and Spanish-surnamed Americans were excluded from employ-
ment and promotions. On appeal, the Association contended that
the trial court had erred in ruling that the plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing, and that they had not made a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion in promotion procedures.
After holding that the plaintiffs had standing,9 the Tenth
Circuit addressed the question of Whether a prima facie case had
been established. The court cited Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,92 a
leading Title VII case,93 for the proposition that a plaintiff can
make a prima facie case of discrimination by merely showing that
the challenged procedures have a discriminatory result. 4 In light
of Griggs, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the Association should
have been allowed to introduce evidence of promotion test results
from prior years, and the trial court's refusal to admit such evi-
dence was error. 5 Further, as to test results which were admitted
into evidence but which the trial court held insufficient to make
out a prima facie case, the Tenth Circuit held that the size of the
group tested was large enough to provide meaningful statistical
data.96
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit
judgment97 and remanded for consideration in light of
Washington v. Davis." In Washington, unsuccessful black appli-
cants for employment as police officers alleged that the use of a
"1 The Tenth Circuit held that because approximately 70% of the Chicano officers in
the Department were members of the Association, the group had the requisite "direct
stake" in the outcome. 526 F.2d at 436. In ruling that the individual members of the
Association had standing, the court likened the officers' position to that of the plaintiffs
in Marable v. Alabama Mental Health Bd., 297 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Ala. 1969), where it
was held that the secondary effects of discrimination on patients gave them standing to
challenge staff hiring procedures. 526 F.2d at 436-37. See also Lee v. Macon County Bd.
of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S.
215 (1967).
22 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
11 The Tenth Circuit adopted the view that "the measure of a claim under the Civil
Rights Act is in essence that applied in a suit under Title VII .... " 526 F.2d at 438
(citing Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972), and Sabol v. Snyder,
524 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1975)). But see text accompanying note 100 infra.
', 526 F.2d at 438.
" Id. at 439.
"Id.
'7 426 U.S. 944 (1976).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
VOL. 54
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
particular written personnel test resulted in racial discrimina-
tion. The case was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) and the
due process clause of the fifth amendment." The Court held that
the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of racial dis-
crimination is not identical to standards applicable under Title
VII.' 00 The decision emphasized that when Title VII is not in-
volved,'01 challenges to facially neutral practices which have a
discriminatory impact will not succeed absent some showing of
intent to discriminate.''
C. Promotions-Sex Discrimination: Olson v. Philco-Ford 0 3
This case involved a charge of sex discrimination in promo-
tion procedures in violation of Title VII.' 0 Olson, a female em-
ployee, applied along with three male employees for a position at
a higher job classification within her company. One of the male
applicants was selected, and Olson brought suit. The trial court
dismissed at the end of plaintiff's evidence. Appealing to the
Tenth Circuit, Olson asserted that she had made out a prima
facie case of discrimination and that dismissal was, therefore,
error.
The Tenth Circuit found that Olson and the male employees
selected for promotion were equally qualified. Backing away from
the "prima facie case" standard argued by Olson, the court
phrased the question as whether the "selection of a qualified man
over a qualified woman, standing alone, makes out a prima facie
case of sex discrimination."''05 The court's statement of the issue
implied the result-such a selection is not an act of discrimina-
tion.
" A claim also was stated under a District of Columbia Code provision. Id. at 233.
'® Id. at 239. But see Castaneda v. Partida, 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977).
,0 The Court noted that in Title VII litigation discriminatory purpose need not be
proven. 426 U.S. at 246-47. The Court declared that "[wie are not disposed to adopt this
more rigorous standard [of Title VII] for the purposes of applying the Fifth and the
Fourteenth Amendments in cases such as this." Id. at 247-48.
102 Id. at 239-40, 246.
103 531 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1976).
,0' The section relied upon was 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964), which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or to otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin . . ..
' 531 F.2d at 478.
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Important in the above quote are the words "standing
alone." Olson had presented certain statistical evidence, but the
court found that it did not bear on promotions. While the court
noted that statistics can be useful in uncovering discrimination,
they must be "closely related to the specific issues presented."''0
Olson's statistics went solely to the issue of the number of women
holding positions at a grade equivalent to, or higher than, the one
for which she had applied. Given these circumstances, the court
limited the language of its recent decision in Rich v. Martin
Marietta, 07 under which Olson theoretically could have stated a
case.'18 In Rich there had been a substantial showing of the differ-
ences in promotions between minority and non-minority employ-
ees, whereas Olson had failed in this regard.
D. Firing
1. Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc.'5
Taylor, a black, was hired in 1968 to work at Safeway's frozen
food warehouse in Denver. Three weeks later he was fired, osten-
sibly because of inadequate job performance. Taylor subse-
quently brought a class action"0 on behalf of virtually all black
Safeway employees in Colorado, alleging discriminatory employ-
ment practices in violation of both section 1981 and 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1970). After narrowing the class and dismissing the section
1981 action for failure to exhaust Title VII remedies, the trial
court ruled on the merits that Taylor had stated an actionable
charge of discrimination based on his firing. Taylor was awarded
back pay and attorney's fees on his individual claim, but the
court found no merit in the class action. On appeal, Taylor
argued inter alia that (1) his class claim had stated a prima facie
case of discrimination; (2) that trial court had abused its discre-
IN Id. at 477 (quoting Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 272 (10th Cir.
1975)).
,o 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975).
lOI Rich held that "[o]nce a plaintiff has shown that he is qualified, he need only
show a discriminatory impact and that he was among the class of employees who could
have been considered for promotion." Id. at 348. Therefore, if promotion of a qualified
male over a qualified female can be said to possibly establish a "discriminatory impact,"
Olson would have stated a case. 531 F.2d at 478. The court found, however, that under
the facts of the case, Olson had suffered no "discriminatory impact."
524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
,o The considerable importance of this case vis-a-vis class action requirements is
discussed in the Federal Pratice and Precedure Overview infra.
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tion in determining the amount of the awards for back pay and
attorney's fees; and (3) failure to exhaust Title VII remedies did
not bar the section 1981 claim.
a. Prima facie case
Taylor had alleged that three of Safeway's practices violated
Title VII. The court noted that should any one of these practices
either presently discriminate against blacks, or, while neutral on
its face, maintain the vestiges of past discrimination, a violation
could be found."' First, Taylor asserted that an employee referal
system used to fill job openings perpetuated past discrimination.
The court held that this was true only when an employer both
primarily relies on this method, and when the use of such a sys-
tem results in a pattern of discrimination. Here, the court found
that while the referral system accounted for fifty percent of ware-
house hirings, there was no statistical evidence of discrimina-
tion."'
Secondly, Taylor argued that a company rule prohibiting
interdepartmental transfers worked to discriminate against
blacks by locking them into manual labor jobs. The court rea-
soned that unless Taylor showed an actual pattern of discrimi-
nation resulting from this policy (which applied equally to all
employees), no violation could be found. Again, examining the
statistics, the court determined that there was no showing of
past discrimination."'
Finally, Taylor asserted that a company hiring policy which
gave preference to applicants with warehouse work experience
discriminated against blacks because they were less likely to have
su'ch experience. Other jurisdictions have previously held that
work-experience requirements may violate Title VII."4 However,
the Tenth Circuit held that when there is no evidence of a dis-
criminatory effect from such a requirement, no violation is estab-
524 F.2d at 271.
,, Id. at 272. Blacks make up 4.1% of the Denver metropolitan area population. Of
the employees hired at Safeway's Denver warehouse during the relevant time period,
blacks accounted for an average of 18% per year. Id.
"I Blacks constituted 4.27% of warehouse employees, whereas they comprised only
2.01% of the total number of employees. The court found the difference statistically
insignificant. Id.
" E.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
1977
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lished."15 Since no discriminatory effect was shown, no case was
proven.
b. Remedies-back pay and attorney's fees
The trial court determined that Taylor's own firing was ra-
cially motivated and, therefore, awarded $3,256 in back pay and
$3,000 for attorney's fees. The back pay period commenced some
time after the firing, and ended eight months later when Taylor
became a fulltime college student. Taylor contended that enter-
ing school should not have rendered him ineligible for back pay.
The court, noting that an award of back pay is discretionary,",
stated that once Taylor returned to school he was not "ready,
willing and available for work," and, therefore, he was not enti-
tled to back pay."'
As for Taylor's argument that the award for attorney's fees
was inadequate, the Tenth Circuit noted that prior awards in
Title VII litigation had been as small as $12 per hour. Taylor's
award amounted to $17 per hour and was therefore not an abuse
of discretion."18 The court nevertheless pointed out that the award
was "modest," and suggested that the trial court reevaluate the
amount."9
524 F.2d at 272.
11 Id. at 267. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970). See Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 422
U.S. 405 (1975). Taylor also asked for reinstatement. However, the court ruled that rein-
statement was a discretionary remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), which in the
trial court's discretion could be (and was) refused. 524 F.2d at 268.
" 524 F.2d at 267. This holding reflects the rule that an act of the discriminatee can
sometimes cut off the applicable back pay period. However, it is unclear as to what acts
so operate. See Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegland Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 970 (1973); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424 (D.
Utah 1971). The case relied on by the Tenth Circuit, United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal
Lathers Local 46, 328 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), indicates that if a wrongfully dis-
charged employee later enrolls full time in college, a back pay award should terminate
only if the individual cannot show that while in school he was "ready, willing and avail-
able" for work. Id. at 443-44. Therefore, what was a factual question under Metal Lathers
has been transformed into a rule of law by the Tenth Circuit.
"I As authority for its position, the Tenth Circuit cited, inter alia, Barela v. United
Nuclear Corp., 462 F.2d 149, 155-56 (10th Cir. 1972). 524 F.2d at 268. The court's reliance
on Barela is misplaced. There, the court upheld a $25 per hour fee, which if applied in
Taylor would have resulted in an award more than 50% higher.
"1 524 F.2d at 268. See also Carreathers v. Alexander, No. C-5082 (D. Colo., Sept.
29, 1976) (order awarding attorney's fees).
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c. Exhaustion of Title VII remedies and section 1981
The trial court ruled that no claim could be raised under
section 1981 until all Title VII remedies were exhausted. The
Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that a claim under section 1981
was completely independent from a Title VII action and could be
brought concurrently.'20 The court thus adopted what was, even
at the time of the trial court decision, the majority rule.'' The
Supreme Court finally laid to rest what was left of this question
with its decision in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,'
holding that an "aggrieved individual clearly is not deprived of
other remedies he possesses and is not limited to Title VII in his
search for relief."'
' 23
2. Smith v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.
2 4
This case raised the question of whether racial or other class-
based "discriminatory animus" must be alleged and proven be-
fore an individual may recover under section 1985(2).121 While
plaintiff-appellant Smith had attempted to allege a conspiracy
aimed at hindering the enforcement of his rights, he did not allege
or prove that such a conspiracy was racially motivated. The
Tenth Circuit relied heavily on Griffin v. Breckenridge,2 1 which
1" 524 F.2d at 274.
121 Id.
12 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
'" Id. at 459.
124 536 F.2d 1320 (10th Cir. 1976).
,25 The section provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by
force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United
States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending
therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his
person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to
influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror
in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account
of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or
of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire
for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any
manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to
deny to an citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his
property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any
person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws . . ..
42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
1- 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
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interpreted section 1985(3)'1 on the same issue.' 5 The court fol-
lowed the rule that a claim under section 1985(2) requires the
same "discriminatory animus" as one under section 1985(3).111
Therefore, the trial court's dismissal was affirmed.




1. Kehrli v. Spinkle'
3'
Colonel Kehrli sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal
district court, challenging his conviction by general court-martial
on several charges of marijuana use, transfer, and possession.
32
The petition was denied, and on appeal Kehrli advanced several
constitutional claims.'1 First, he argued that Article 134 was im-
'" 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
In Griffin the Supreme Court held that although section 1985(3) was meant to
reach private conspiracies, it was not intended to "apply to all tortious, conspiratorial
interferences with the rights of others," but only those motivated by "some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus ... " 403 U.S. at 101-
02. "Animus" is distinguished from "scienter," or "specific intent." As Justice Stewart,
writing for the Court in Griffin, noted: "The motivation aspect of § 1985(3) focuses not
on scienter but on invidious discriminatory animus." Id. at 102 n.10.
.9 536 F.2d at 1323.
"' Prisoners, mental patients, and military personnel are groups generally associated
with diminished constitutional protection. See N. DoRSEN, P. BENDER, and B. NEUBORNE,
EMERSON, HABER & DoRsEN's POLrTCAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1320-433
(4th ed. 1976). While this survey does not have occasion to examine a decision concerning
the constitutional rights of mental patients, the Tenth Circuit did recently decide the case
of Strano v. Giron, No. 75-1598 (10th Cir., July 14, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication),
which held that neither equal protection nor due process guarantees are violated by
different treatment of voluntary, as opposed to involuntary, hospital patients.
Also included in this section is a case involving Indian affairs. While Indians are not
traditionally linked with the above groups, they are however accorded special judicial
treatment because of their particular status. See text accompanying notes 155-57 infra.
131 524 F.2d 328 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1976).
"' Kehrli had been convicted under Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970). It provides:
[AiII disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in
the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this
chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or
summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense,
and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.
" In addition to the constitutional issues discussed in the text, Kehrli raised a ques-
tion as to the proper scope of judicial review in court-martial cases. Relying on Burns v.
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permissibly vague and overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional
on its face. However, this argument was fatally undermined when
the two circuit court decisions upon which it rested were over-
ruled by the Supreme Court while Kehrli's appeal was pending.'34
Kehrli further contended that the conviction and sentence vio-
lated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, his right
of privacy, and the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.
Kehrli's equal protection argument was based on the fact
that Article 134 is supplemented by a provision which makes it
"a violation of this article [134] wrongfully to possess or use
marijuana or a habit forming narcotic drug."' 35 Kehrli argued
that to place marijuana in the same class as habit-forming nar-
cotics violates equal protection. The Tenth Circuit held that since
the maximum penalty for marijuana use or possession differed
from that for violations involving habit-forming drugs, the classi-
fication did not violate equal protection.
The court summarily dismissed Kehrli's privacy and eighth
amendment claims. Kehrli had argued that since marijuana pro-
duces only mild, harmless effects, government regulation con-
cerning it violated his constitutional right to privacy. The court
held that on balance, the military's interest in regulating mari-
juana use among service personnel in combat zones, and on or
near military installations, outweighed any right to privacy which
Kehrli might otherwise possess.'36 In regard to his eighth amend-
ment argument, Kehrli urged that his sentence of three years at
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), the Tenth Circuit stated that the scope of review in military
cases was narrower than in civil habeas corpus proceedings, and that the courts' function
was to "determine whether the military gave fair consideration to each of the petitioner's
constitutional claims." 524 F.2d at 331 (quoting King v. Moseley, 430 F.2d 732 (10th Cir.
1970)). Additionally, Kehrli urged that off-duty marijuana use could not be prosecuted
under Article 134. The court, citing no cases, found to the contrary. Id. at 332-33. See
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975); United States v. Rose, 19 C.M.A. 3, 41
C.M.R. 3 (1969). But see Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972); Redmond v. Warner,
355 F. Supp. 812 (D. Hawaii 1973). Finally, rejecting Kehrli's claim that he had been
denied sufficient access to counsel, the court found that his case had been given "full
consideration," and that there had been no showing of actual prejudice resulting from any
alleged defects. 524 F.2d at 333.
'" Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974), reversing 477 F.2d 1237 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), reversing 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973).
' U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 213(b) (rev. ed. 1969).
' ' 524 F.2d at 332.
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hard labor plus a $15,000 fine was excessive and constituted cruel
and unusual punishment. The court stated that while severe, it
was within the "authorized maximum sentence.' 37 Thus, the
eighth amendment claim was held to have no merit.
13
1
2. Moore v. Schlesinger"'
Appellant Moore, an Air Force Captain, was relieved of his
teaching duties at the Air Force Academy in 1973 and reassigned
to overseas duty. Thereupon, Moore resigned his commission and
brought this suit alleging, inter alia, that his transfer had been
punishment for writing letters to various Congressmen concern-
ing certain Academy policies. Moore contended that the Air Force
action in reassigning him violated his first amendment right to
freedom of expression. Damages were sought.40
The court recognized the principle that "citizens in uniform
may not be stripped of basic rights because they have doffed their
civilian clothes."'' However, the court held that military inter-
ests had to be balanced against individual interests, and that the
court had jurisdiction to review a case like Moore's only when the
military action was so restrictive of a serviceman's fundamental
rights as to "deny them altogether and thus constitute an abuse
of the broad discretion granted to military officers . . ,. . Not-
ing the longstanding policy of judicial non-interference in the
military duty assignment area,4 3 the court found no abuse of
discretion. Since there was no jurisdiction, the case was dis-
missed.
137 Id.
"' Cases are legion which hold that, regardless of severity of length, penalties within
legislatively set bounds are constitutional. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 407 F.2d 356
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 966 (1969); Hedrick v. United States, 357 F.2d 121 (10th
Cir. 1966); United States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1964); Lindsey v. United
States, 332 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1964).
No. 74-1882 (10th Cir., Nov. 21, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
Originally Moore also sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, manda-
mus, a writ of habeas corpus, and an order reinstating him at the Academy. However, the
court held that only the damage claim survived and that all other claims were mooted by
his voluntary act of resignation. Id. at 4-5.
"' Id. at 5 (quoting Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV.
181, 188 (1962)).





1. Marchesani v. McCune'
Marchesani was a federal prisoner who had been classified in
the records of the Bureau of Prisons as a "special offender."' 45 On
appeal from the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition, Marches-
ani alleged that classifying him as such, absent a prior hearing,
violated his right to procedural due process. The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that the prisoner's classifica-
tion was based upon the nature of his previous convictions,
whereas in the cases relied upon by Marchesani the classification
rested upon "unsupported allegations in presentence reports."' 46
Analyzing the due process claim, the court noted the wide
latitude that the government has traditionally been afforded in
the conduct of its internal affairs, especially within the context
of prison management.'47 Given this principle, the Tenth Circuit
held that actions taken by prison officials, affecting what would
normally be constituted a right in a non-prison environment,
violate due process only when such actions constitute a clear
abuse of an official's discretionary powers.'48 Finding no such
abuse of discretion, the court dismissed the petition.
2. Clark v. Leach'49
Appellant Clark, a prisoner, originally brought suit in state
court alleging that the prison's refusal to provide surgery for a
cataract constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the eighth amendment. The New Mexico Supreme Court af-
firmed a lower court decision which held that while prisoners are
entitled to adequate medical care, the operation was "elective
531 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976).
"Special Offenders" require "greater case management supervision" than usual
offenders. 531 F.2d at 461. The court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 4081 (1970) as placing a duty
upon prison officials to classify inmates. 531 F.2d at 461.
"I Id. at 460. Marchesani had relied on Catalano v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 346
(D. Conn. 1974), and Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Conn. 1973).
"1 531 F.2d at 461. The court cited with approval Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974), where Mr. Justice Stewart wrote for the majority: "[l]awful incarceration brings
about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction
justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Id. at 822 (citations omit-
ted).
531 F.2d at 462.
No. 76-1022 (10th Cir., Aug. 25, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
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surgery." Failure to provide such surgery did not constitute viola-
tion of the eighth amendment. 50
Clark did not petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court,
but instituted this action based on the same facts in federal
court. '' The Tenth Circuit held that the principle of res judicata
applied to suits brought under section 1983 where there had al-
ready been a prior state court adjudication on the same constitu-
tional claim. 5 ' The court held that the eighth amendment claim,
and a due process claim which the court found was included
within the eighth amendment claim, had already been fully liti-
gated at the state level.'53 Hence Clark was barred from reassert-
ing these claims in federal court.
C. Indian Affairs:'54 Potts v. Bruce'
This case arose when the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) took
action to withdraw approval of the Tribal Business Committee of
the Prairie Band of the Pottawatomi Indians, and their Tribal
Constitution. The BIA acted after the committee, torn by an
internal dispute, reached a stalemate and was unable to conduct
tribal business. A BIA-sponsored resolution was adopted whereby
approval of the constitution and the committee was withdrawn,
and a new group was formed to draft another constitution. Mem-
bers of the defunct committee sued, alleging that their rights
under the first and fifth amendments had been violated by the
BIA.
The Tenth Circuit held that an individual tribal member
had a vested right "in any particular law or in the Tribal Consti-
tution."'56 Thus such laws could always be changed, providing
that the means used were permissible. Finding that the contro-
versy was completely intratribal, the Tenth Circuit applied the
1 Id. at 2. Cf. Prins v. Bennett, No. 75-1616 (10th Cir., March 8, 1976) (Not for
Routine Publication) (failure of unlicensed prison physician to examine inmate held nei-
ther abuse of discretion nor violation of prisoner's eighth amendment rights).
'5' The federal action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
52 No. 76-1022 at 3.
"' Id. at 3-4.
"5 See the case comment following this overview for a discussion of Martinez v. Santa
Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976) (interpreting the Indian Civil Rights Act).
533 F.2d 527 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976).
'5 533 F.2d at 529.
VOL. 54
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
general rule that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to decide
such disputes. '57
David H. Miller
SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS IN TRIBAL ORDINANCES
AND THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039
(10th Cir. 1976)
By RUTH CASAREZ-ANDERSEN,* LESLIE M. LAWSON** AND
DAVID H. MILLER***
INTRODUCTION
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo' is one of the few decisions
to date which has set out to define the substantive limits of a right
guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act 2 (ICRA). At issue was
"I Id. at 530 (collecting cases). This rule, however, is not absolute, and when intratri-
bal disputes act to deprive tribal members of certain enumerated rights guaranteed by
either federal law or the Constitution, an action will lie. See the case comment following
this overview.
* Clinical Education Supervisor and Instructor of Law, University of Denver College
of Law; B.A., 1968, University of Texas at Austin; J.D., 1973, University of Denver.
** Attorney, Feiger & Lawson; B.A., 1969, University of Wyoming; J.D., 1972, Uni-
versity of Wyoming.
*** B.A., 1973, Duke University; J.D., 1977, University of Denver.
540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1070 (1977).
2 In 1924 Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act which extended United States
citizenship to all American-born Indians. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2) (1970). Since that time
Indians have been invested by law with all of the constitutional rights enjoyed by other
citizens in their dealings with state and federal governments. Until 1968, however, the
relationship between individual Indians and their tribal governments was generally held
to be outside of federal judicial cognizance. See note 16 infra and accompanying text. The
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1970)), was the first piece of legislation by which Congress inter-
jected substantive constitutional principles into intratribal relationships. See note 15 infra
and accompanying text. Section 202 of the Act conferred specific constitutional rights on
Indians in their dealings with tribal governments. The equal protection clause of the Act
appears in subsection (8):
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
1977
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whether the equal protection clause of the Act was violated by a
tribal ordinance3 which denied Pueblo membership to children
born of marriages between female Pueblo members and male
nonmembers, but granted membership to children born of mar-
riages between male Pueblo members and female nonmembers.'
In answering this question, the Tenth Circuit struck down
the ordinance and articulated a novel test which may be broadly
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue war-
rants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized;
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
(4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself;
(5) take any private property for a public use without just compensa-
tion;
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy
and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,
to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense;
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unu-
sual punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense
any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six
months or a fine of $500, or both;
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of
law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprison-
ment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) (emphasis added) [the ICRA equal protection clause is herein-
after referred to in text and footnotes as § 1302(8)].
1 Appellants also alleged that the ordinance violated their due process rights under
the ICRA. 540 F.2d at 1040. However, the court did not address this issue.
' The ordinance, enacted December 15, 1939 by the Council of Pueblo of Santa Clara,
New Mexico, reads:
1. All children born of marriages between members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
2. All children born of marriages between male members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo and non-members shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
3. Children born of marriages between female members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo and non-members shall not be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
4. Persons shall not be naturalized as members of the Santa Clara Pueblo
under any circumstances.
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1041 n.2 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. granted,
429 U.S. 1070 (1977). Appellants challenged subparagraphs 2 and 3.
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applicable to similar issues that may arise under the Act.' This
comment will define and analyze the parameters of that test in
part II, and in part III will take a critical look at its application
to the present case. Initially, however, it is necessary to examine
some important jurisdictional issues raised by the case.
I. IMMUNITY AND JURISDICTION UNDER THE ICRA
The Martinez litigation was initiated when female members
of the Pueblo brought a class action' challenging the Pueblo's
1939 membership ordinance on the ground that it discriminated
against them. These women had married men who were not mem-
bers of the Pueblo. In particular, appellant Martinez had married
a full-blooded Navajo in 1941, and since that time the couple had
lived continuously on the Santa Clara Pueblo with their children.
Beginning in 1946, Mrs. Martinez attempted to enroll her chil-
dren in the Pueblo. She continued in this effort until the time of
the suit. Despite her use of all available tribal procedures, her
children were consistently denied enrollment.'
The Pueblo advanced two grounds as to why the court lacked
jurisdiction. First, the tribe argued that the ICRA did not provide
a jurisdictional basis for the action. Second, it urged that sover-
eign immunity barred the suit. The court dealt briefly with these
objections, dismissing both within a single paragraph. Relying
heavily on one of its earlier decisions, Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v.
United States,' the court held that a statute which gives district
courts jurisdiction over actions brought to protect civil rights
granted by Congress' provided a jurisdictional basis for suits
brought under the ICRA.10 Noting further that the ICRA was
designed by Congress to protect individual Indians from tribal
See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
Appellants' children, who were disenfranchised, were also members of the class.
The courts have generally required plaintiffs to exhaust their tribal remedies before
beginning litigation. Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976);
McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700
(8th Cir. 1973); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973).
515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970) gives federal district courts original jurisdiction in civil
suits brought "[tlo recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote."
"* 540 F.2d at 1042. For the trial court's resolution of the jurisdictional issue raised
in Martinez, see Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975) (decided
without benefit of the Tenth Circuit's holding in Dry Creek Lodge).
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abuses, the court found clear Congressional intent to allow "civil
rights" suits against a tribe."
While this jurisdictional analysis represents the current
trend, 12 it is of rather recent vintage. Before enactment of the
ICRA, Congress traditionally took a cautious approach when
dealing with Indian civil rights. There are, of course, many trea-
ties and statutes relating to Indians, 4 but the ICRA stands vir-
tually alone in affecting fundamental intratribal relationships.'
Prior to the passage of the ICRA, the courts likewise exercised
restraint. Courts were reluctant to impose traditional constitu-
tional standards on social structure they knew little about.'
When federal courts were asked to assume jurisdiction under
the newly enacted ICRA, their response was mixed. Some courts
refrained from taking jurisdiction, 7 while others were not so reti-
* 540 F.2d at 1042.
* See notes 22-23 infra and accompanying text.
11 For a discussion of pre-ICRA aspects of tribal sovereign immunity, see Note, The
Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 1343, 1346-53 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Indian Bill of Rights].
" See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 485-608 (1971) for a list of all
federal statutes and treaties relating to Indian affairs from 1789-1938.
'" There are limited exceptions to this principle. For example, The Major Crimes Act,
23 Stat. 385 (1885), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970), gave jurisdiction to United
States territorial courts to hear serious criminal cases involving Indian victims and defen-
dants. The Act and its amendments, however, are not so much intrusions into intratribal
relationships as definitions of tribal authority.
The Wheeler-Howard Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 16, 48 Stat. 987 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 476 (1970)) might, on its face, be interpreted as affecting intratribal political
rights. The Act set out procedures by which tribes could organize and adopt constitutions.
Cases interpreting this Act emphasize, however, that its purpose was to restore self-control
to the tribes and not to define individual political rights. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v.
Morton, 499 F.2d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). See
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973).
" The landmark case of Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), firmly established at
an early date the principle that Indian tribes were not subject to the same constitutional
restrictions as were federal and state governments. Starting with Mayes, this concept of
tribal sovereignty-that Indian tribes could do what they pleased, as they pleased, unless
Congress had expressly indicated otherwise-continued to be observed by the overwhelm-
ing majority of courts until passage of the ICRA. See Burnett, An Historical Analysis of
the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights' Act, 9 HARv. J. LEGIS. 557, 559-74 (1972).
"7 The much-cited case of Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971), pro-
vides a typical example of early judicial self-restraint under the ICRA. In Groundhog
plaintiffs sought a declaration that the original appointment and subsequent election of
a tribal chief violated section 1302(8). The court held that the allegations merely evi-
denced an internal dispute over which the court did not have jurisdiction. Id. at 682-83.
In Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971), the court applied
VOL. 54
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
cent. In Dodge v. Nakai,'5 decided less than a year after enact-
ment of the ICRA, it was held that when a plaintiff asserts a right
"purportedly guaranteed" by the ICRA a federal court has juris-
diction to hear the case.'9 The first court of appeals case to adopt
this expansive view was Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe.20 There,
the sole question was whether the district court had jurisdiction
to decide if a provision of a tribal constitution conflicted with the
ICRA and the United States Constitution. The court stated: "To
hold there to be a lack of jurisdiction. . . would, in effect, destroy
the efficacy of the Indian Bill of Rights [ICRA]."2 '
In Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States,2 the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted the broad rule of Nakai and Luxon,'23 supporting its
decision with an impressive array of cases.24 The court's exclusive
reliance on Dry Creek reaffirms its acceptance of the broadest
statement of the jurisdictional rule. In essence, the court has held
that there is federal jurisdiction whenever a plaintiff alleges that
his rights under the ICRA have been infringed.
2 5
the methodology of Groundhog and held the allegations "insufficient to bring into play
the Indian Bill of Rights." Id. at 282. And in Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp. 619 (D.N.D.
1973), the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a claim that plaintiff Indian had
been denied due process when his tribal court refused his request for a jury trial. Citing
Groundhog, the court held that the ICRA was not meant to substitute a federal forum for
tribal courts. Id. at 622.
" 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
" Id. at 25. For further discussion of this case see Tenth Circuit Survey, 53 DEN. L.J.
158-61 (1976).
- 455 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 700.
22 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 933. Several other cases had already employed this logic. See, e.g., Crowe v.
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1234 (4th Cir. 1974); Johnson v.
Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200, 203 (9th Cir. 1973).
21 In stating its rule, the court cited over 15 cases. 515 F.2d at 933 n.6. However,
almost half of the court of appeals' decisions relied on were tribal election cases which
had been decided under a narrower rule than the one stated in either Nakai or Luxon. In
the election cases, the courts articulated a special rule for situations in which tribes had
adopted procedures analogous to those found in Anglo-American culture. For example, in
Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973), the court held that it had jurisdiction
solely because plaintiffs alleged that a tribal apportionment scheme violated the one-man,
one-vote principle incorporated into tribal practices. See also Brown v. United States, 486
F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1973); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973). The
rationale behind these cases seems to be that to accept jurisdiction where tribes have
adopted Anglo-American practices would not force an alien culture upon the Indians. See
Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 238-39 (9th Cir. 1976). Yet in neither
Dry Creek nor Martinez had the tribe incorporated any Anglo-American practices.
21 However, allegations must be sufficient to state a claim under the relevant law. See
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II. ICRA EQUAL PROTECTION
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis in Martinez by examin-
ing the legislative history of the ICRA. The court noted that
Congress had been presented with conflicting testimony as to how
the Act would affect tribal sovereignty." While acknowledging
that Congress had intended to recognize the cultural autonomy
and integrity of the Indian tribes, the court also emphasized Con-
gressional "intent to extend broad constitutional protections to
individual Indians."27 Faced with this conflict the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the legislative history dictated the use of a balanc-
ing test:
About the only way to resolve this conflict is to recognize the
necessity to evaluate and weigh both of these interests. Thus the
scope, extent and importance of the tribal interest is to be taken
into account. The individual right to fair treatment under the law
is likewise to be weighed against the tribal interest by considering
the clearness of the guarantee together with the magnitude of the
interest generally and as applied to the particular facts.2"
The court then proceeded to examine prior cases which had
presented related questions involving section 1302(8). First, the
court distinguished a well-established line of cases holding that
tribes may set a minimum blood quantum requirement for tribal
membership without violating the equal protection clause of the
Potts v. Bruce, 533 F.2d 527 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976) (allegations
insufficient to confer jurisdiction).
540 F.2d at 1044.
Id. See generally Burnett, supra note 16, at 577-89. The court noted that the Act,
as originally drafted, "would have made tribal governments fully subject to all constitu-
tional restraints and requirements." 540 F.2d at 1044. Congress rejected that version,
however, because of the difficulties which would have resulted from attempting to recon-
cile certain culturally based tribal practices with basic constitutional principles, e.g.,
blood quantum requirements for tribal membership and voting, and the existence of tribal
theocracies. Id. The version which Congress ultimately adopted selectively incorporated
specific constitutional guarantees. Id. See Burnett, supra note 16, at 589-92.
1 540 F.2d at 1045 (footnote omitted). This standard is similar to the "sliding scale"
approach to equal protection articulated by Justice Marshall in Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970): "[Cloncentration must be placed upon the character of the classifi-
cation in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state
interests in support of the classification." Id. at 520-21 (dissenting opinion). See San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).




ICRA. 9 These cases were found to be inapposite:
The fact that the blood quantum requirement has been sus-
tained furnishes little basis for upholding the discrimination in the
case at bar because [in the blood quantum cases] there is some
semblance of [a] basis for the classification. This is in terms of
ancestral lines and in maintaining the integrity of the membership.30
Turning to other cases wherein plaintiffs had relied upon
section 1302(8), the Tenth Circuit found that "[ilnvariably the
courts look to the Fourteenth Amendment. . . as a guide." '3' The
court ended its discussion of the precedents by acknowledging
decisions which had stressed the importance of recognizing tribal
traditions and cultural values.32 Thus, by the court's analysis,
both the legislative and the case history of the ICRA indicated
that a court should adopt a balancing test, administered in the
context of constitutional equal protection,33 to determine the va-
lidity of tribal laws challenged under section 1302(8) .31
The court was undoubtedly correct in refusing to apply a
See, e.g., Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); Slattery v. Arapahoe
Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971).
540 F.2d at 1046.
31 Id.
32 Id. See Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976); Means
v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
" The court characterized the fourteenth amendment equal protection standard as a
"persuasive guide." 540 F.2d at 1047. The Tenth Circuit's standard is thus a combination
of two tests-a balancing test intermingled with traditional fourteenth amendment analy-
sis. Application of this standard would seem to require that the court first define what
individual interests were at stake in the litigation. Next the court would look to the
established mode of fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis which would nor-
mally apply when such an interest was involved. If, for example, the traditional approach
when dealing with a particular interest would require a mere "rational relationship"
between the tribal interest and the tribal action at issue, the court would consider the
factors to be balanced and determine whether the tribal interest merely outweighed the
private interest, since any preponderance of tribal interest over individual interest would
provide a rational basis for upholding the tribal action.
However, if under traditional fourteenth amendment analysis the private interest at
stake required strict judicial scrutiny of the challenged tribal action, a tribe would have
to show, on balance, that its interests so outweighed the individual interest as to satisfy
this stricter application of the balancing test. Seen in this light, the Tenth Circuit's
statement that it will use fourteenth amendment standards as a "persuasive guide" in the
application of its balancing test relates to the degree to which tribal interests will have to
predominate over individual interests on application of the court's balancing test. See
Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976).
1 In the remaining discussion, the phrase "tribal law" will be used to denote any
tribal action subject to scrutiny under section 1302(8).
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purely constitutional standard of equal protection. The language
of the Act-prohibiting a tribe from denying "the equal protec-
tion of its laws" 35-contrasts with the fourteenth amendment
guarantee of the protection of the laws. This in itself seems to
support the application of a different standard in cases arising
under the ICRA. 31 Further, earlier cases interpreting section
1302(8) pointed out persuasive legislative history which indicated
that "in some respects the equal protection requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment should not be embraced in the Indian
Bill of Rights.
3 7
While it is true that many cases have looked to the four-
teenth amendment as a guide in interpreting the ICRA, it is not
true that the courts "invariably" do So.3 In fact, courts have been
singularly unsuccessful in formulating anything approaching a
broadly acceptable model of equal protection under the Act. 39
Typically, judicial theories as to the meaning of ICRA equal pro-
tection have varied with the type of classification made, or nature
of the rights affected, by tribal laws.40 Martinez is thus unusual
in its statement of a general approach that may be applicable to
a broad variety of factual settings.4'
u 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (emphasis added).
See Comment, Equal Protection Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 627, 632 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection].
17 Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971). See also Wounded Head
v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975); White Eagle v. One
Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973).
u See, e.g., Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143, 1150 (D.S.D. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975).
E.g., in Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976), the court
applied a balancing test in light of strict scrutiny equal protection because a tribal resi-
dency requirement affected fundamental rights. Yet in Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d
700 (9th Cir. 1973), the court held that a blood quantum requirement, affecting what could
be characterized as fundamental rights, would be valid if uniformly applied.
,0 Should tribes adopt Anglo-American practices they will generally find their laws
subject to constitutional equal protection analysis. See Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.
1973).
1 Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976), employed a
balancing test much like the one used in Martinez. In Howlett, however, the court specifi-
cally held that it was not formulating a general rule. Id. at 238-39.
One author has suggested a bifurcated model. Under this analysis a court would
merely require equal application of tribal laws which were found to be culturally based
and consistent with tribal standards of equality. Conversely, if a law had no cultural basis,
fourteenth amendment equal protection standards would apply. Equal Protection, supra
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The Supreme Court has declined to adopt a single model of
constitutional equal protection'" -a position which is consistent
with the approach suggested by the Tenth Circuit in Martinez.
3
The legislative history of the ICRA, and specifically section
1302(8), seems to mandate a flexible judicial response." Use of a
balancing test superimposed upon traditional constitutional
analysis would enable the courts to weigh more sensitively the
competing interests which will generally be present in these
cases.' 5 Yet, while the Tenth Circuit purported to engage in this
technique, an examination of the decision demonstrates that the
court did not adhere very strictly to its own formula.
note 36, at 633-34. This scheme, however, might allow a tribe to go to extreme lengths in
effectuating culturally based classifications. The courts' inability to reach certain tribal
action under this model could easily frustrate Congress' intent in enacting section 1302(8).
See Indian Bill of Rights, supra note 13, at 1362. While the author observes that British
courts have applied a standard similar to the one suggested in dealing with certain African
tribal cultures, Equal Protection, supra note 36, at 634, the analogy is inappropriate, for
British courts have no equivalent to the ICRA to influence their decisions. Further, the
legislative history of section 1302(8), and its incorporation of constitutional terms of art,
evidence congressional intent to extend greater protection to American Indians than is
contemplated by British statutes which give courts the power to invalidate African tribal
laws that are "repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience." Id. at 634 n.54.
See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1044-45 (10th Cir. 1976).
,2 "Old equal protection" and "new equal protection" have been joined in recent
years by "newer equal protection." See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972). The "sliding-scale" approach sug-
gested by Justice Marshall, see note 28 supra, has never been supported by a majority of
the Court. See Note, Equal Protection: Modes of Analysis in the Burger Court, 53 DEN.
L.J. 687, 715-19 (1976).
" The approach suggested in Martinez would not result in the application of one
identifiable "test" in all ICRA equal protection cases. Rather the courts would utilize a
flexible balancing test applied in the light of constitutional principles. See notes 28 and
31 supra and accompanying text.
" Cf. Indian Bill of Rights, supra note 13, at 1360-68 (outlining the different types of
problems to which courts will have to respond).
," While such an elastic standard might arguably be subject to judicial abuse, cases
decided under the ICRA strongly suggest that the courts will zealously safeguard tribal
prerogatives and will refrain from intervention in intratribal matters unless absolutely
necessary. Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976) (upholding
a tribal residency requirement in the face of a balancing test requiring a compelling tribal
interest). Cf., e.g., Potts v. Bruce, 533 F.2d 527 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002
(1976) (no jurisdiction although plaintiffs alleged constitutional violations); but see Equal
Protection, supra note 36, at 629 (suggesting that the Tenth Circuit decision in Martinez
did not give enough weight to tribal interests).
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III. MEASURING THE ORDINANCE AGAINST THE ICRA
In defining the elements in Martinez which were to go into
its balancing test, the Tenth Circuit minimized the importance
of tribal interests in the ordinance. In brief, the court found that
the ordinance was not logically related to the cultural survival of
the Pueblo.4" Nor did tribal history support the Pueblo's argu-
ment that the ordinance embodied traditional patrilineal, patri-
local, or patricultural tribal values. 7 Rather the court concluded
that the ordinance was adopted in 1939 merely as an economic
and pragmatic response to an unprecedented increase in mixed
marriages which threatened to swell the Pueblo population and
deplete per capita resources. 8 While acknowledging the import-
ance of tribal power to define its own membership, the Tenth
Circuit characterized this particular ordinance as an arbitrary
solution to what was essentially a tribal economic problem and
not a matter of tribal integrity."9 In contrast, the court empha-
sized the individual's interest in tribal membership. This interest
was found to include "living in a particular cultural setting in
close relationship with fellow members, inheriting tribal rights,
and enjoying federal and other incidental benefits." 50 Moreover,
,1 The court is correct in the sense that the ordinance is not related to maintaining a
tribal blood quantum requirement. 540 F.2d at 1046. A hypothetical dramatically demon-
strates this: If a full-blooded Santa Claran female member (F') married a male non-
member (M') whose mother had been full-blooded Santa Claran but whose father was only
half-blood Santa Claran, all on his mother's side, the offspring of F' and MI, although of
more than 3/4 Santa Clara blood, would not be eligible for Pueblo membership under the
challenged ordinance. On the other hand, if a female nonmember with no Santa Clara
blood (F') married a male Pueblo member (MI) whose mother had no Santa Clara blood
but whose father was half-blooded Santa Claran, all on his father's side, all of their
offspring, although of only 1/4 Santa Clara blood, would qualify for Pueblo membership.
Repeating the above pattern through nine generations, the descendents of F' and M' would
still possess more than 3/4 Santa Clara blood yet would be ineligible for membership;
while descendants of F2 and M1, possessing less than 1/2000 Santa Clara blood, would
qualify for membership.
" 540 F.2d at 1047. The court noted that, before enactment of the ordinance, prob-
lems such as the one raised in Martinez were dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Id.
0 Id. The district court accorded more weight to the Pueblo's "economic" interest in
the ordinance, noting that "[t]he ability of the Pueblo to control the use and distribution
of its resources enhances its ability to maintain its cultural autonomy." Martinez v. Santa
Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 16 (D.N.M. 1975) (upholding the ordinance).
' 540 F.2d at 1048.
Id. at 1047 (footnote omitted). The district court specified three types of tribal
rights associated with membership: (1) political rights-to vote, to hold office, and to raise
matters before the Pueblo Council; (2) rights to Pueblo resources-land, water, hunting,
and fishing rights; and (3) residential rights-to live on the Pueblo. 402 F. Supp. at 14.
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those who faced exclusion under the terms of the ordinance were
not cultural outsiders to the Pueblo. They were "culturally, for
all practical purposes, Santa Clara Indians."
5'
Having indentified the interests at stake, the court applied
its balancing test in light of an equal protection standard calling
for strict scrutiny of the classification involved. The court clearly
adopted as its "persuasive guide '52 the essentials of an equal
protection analysis based on strict scrutiny. First, the court
placed upon the tribe the burden of justifying the ordinance; 53
this burden was not met. 5' Second, the court noted that the tribe
could have solved its problem in a manner less restrictive to the
rights of the affected individuals. 5 Finally, the court used the
familiar rhetoric of strict scrutiny analysis, holding that the tribal
interest in the ordinance was not "compelling.""
The Tenth Circuit is not the first court to approach section
1302(8) in this manner. In Howlett v. Salish and Kootenai
Tribes57 the Ninth Circuit considered whether a tribal residency
requirement violated ICRA equal protection. The court first as-
sumed that the challenged provision abridged certain fundamen-
tal rights protected by the Act." The Ninth Circuit concluded
that the trial court had been correct in subjecting the provision
to the compelling interest test. 9 Balancing the tribal interest at
stake against the plaintiffs' interest, the court upheld the provi-
sion, noting that "compelling interests justify the imposition of
[the] . . . residency requirement . . .,,0
1, 540 F.2d at 1048 (quoting Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 18
(D.N.M. 1975)). This finding related only to the Martinez children. The ties of the other
class members to the Pueblo were not discussed.
52 See note 33 supra.
-" 540 F.2d at 1047. Once a court decides that governmental action should be subject
to strict judicial scrutiny, the Government has the burden of justifying its classifications.
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
1, 540 F.2d at 1047.
Is Id. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
" 540 F.2d at 1047. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
57 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976).
At issue were the right to travel and the right to seek office. Id. at 235.
' Id. at 242.
o Id. at 244. Application of strict scrutiny has usually signalled doom for the chal-
lenged governmental action. See Note, The Mandate for a New Equal Protection Model,
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In Howlett the court used strict scrutiny as its guide where
facts indicated that plaintiffs had been deprived of a basic consti-
tutional right traditionally associated with such a standard. In
Martinez the court preferred to look primarily at the classifica-
tion involved (sex) and not the rights affected.' By viewing sex
as a classification which invoked strict scrutiny-based analysis
the Tenth Circuit went farther than the Supreme Court had yet
gone, or indicated that it is likely to go.2 Moreover, a case arising
under the ICRA would seem to be a particularly inappropriate
place to extend the rule concerning sex-based classifications .
3
In light of the conflicting goals of the ICRA-to protect the
civil rights of individual Indians while preserving the quasi-
sovereign nature of the Indian tribes-it seems appropriate that
a court would engage in a balancing test when measuring a tribal
law against section 1302(8). However, to apply such a test in the
context of strict scrutiny is ill-considered when dealing with a
classification never before accorded such treatment. The better
course would be for the courts to adopt the approach suggested,
but not followed, by the Tenth Circuit in Martinez. That is, when
a challenged law is rooted in tribal tradition and cultural values,
a court would apply a balancing test in light of established four-
teenth amendment equal protection analysis. 4 However, when no
tribal cultural interest is involved, engaging in a balancing pro-
cess would be superfluous. This is essentially the reasoning un-
derlying those cases wherein tribes had adopted Anglo-American
practices.65
24 CAm. U. L. REv. 558, 559 (1975). However, Howlett is joined by a small number of
Supreme Court cases which have also upheld governmental action in the face of strict
scrutiny. See American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724 (1974); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
11 540 F.2d at 1046-47. While the court approached the case as a classification prob-
lem, in the balancing process it became clear that the court was also deeply concerned
with the nature and extent of the rights affected. Id. at 1047.
" None of the sex discrimination cases cited by the Tenth Circuit support application
of the strict scrutiny standard. 540 F.2d at 1047. Indeed, recent decisions emphasize that
the Supreme Court has no intention of requiring that sex-based classifications satisfy a
compelling interest test. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 97 S. Ct. 1192 (1977); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
0 See Equal Protection, supra note 36, at 629-30.
" See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1047 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 2172 (1977). See also note 33 supra.
11 E.g., Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 238-39 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Thus, a bifurcated standard is proposed." In each case the
court should first look to see whether a tribal law would violate
constitutional equal protection. If no tribal cultural interst is in-
volved, the court will apply the appropriate constitutional stan-
dard and end its analysis there. But if a tribal law is found to be
rooted in the tribal culture, and the tribal law would normally be
violative of constitutional equal protection, the court will proceed
to apply a balancing test in light of established equal protection
analysis.6
CONCLUSION
Having accepted a broad interpretation of federal jurisdic-
tion under the ICRA, the court in Martinez was faced with the
difficult task of giving substantive meaning to the Act's equal
protection clause. The Tenth Circuit purported to balance tribal
interests and cultural values against the individual interests af-
fected in light of established constitutional standards. Adopting
strict scrutiny analysis as the applicable constitutional model,"
the court overturned the ordinance, minimizing tribal arguments
that the sex-based distinction was culturally rooted. While the
Tenth Circuit was arguably correct in its result," utilization of
the hallmarks of strict scrutiny was inappropriate given the na-
ture of the classification involved.
" See Equal Protection, supra note 36, at 633-34 (suggesting the different bifurcated
model set out supra note 41).
" This bifurcated approach was implicitly adopted by the court in its treatment of
the case. Initially, the ordinance was measured against constitutional requirements. 540
F.2d at 1046-47. Only after it was found lacking under fourteenth amendment standards
did the court proceed to balance the interests according to its newly articulated test. Id.
at 1047. See note 33 supra.
" See note 33 supra.
" Had the Tenth Circuit applied its balancing test using established equal protection
principles as a guide, the same result might have been reached. In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971) (sex discrimination), the Supreme Court held: "A classification 'must be reason-
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly situated
are treated alike."' Id. at 76 (citation omitted). In Martinez the court concluded that the
ordinance was arbitrary, 540 F.2d at 1048, and unrelated to the tribal objective. 540 F.2d
at 1046 (by implication).
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RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ON
TERMINATION: RECENT TENTH CIRCUIT CASES
INTRODUCTION
When a government assumes the role of an employer, ques-
tions inevitably arise concerning an employee's rights when the
decision is made not to renew his employment contract or to fire
him. The employee may be entitled to procedural or substantive
protection under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' Last term the Tenth Circuit faced the issue of a govern-
mental employee's rights upon termination in several cases.'
In 1972, the Supreme Court decided two cases, Board of Re-
gents v. Roth3 and Perry v. Sindermann, 4 which set out a frame-
work for defining the liberty and property interests of government
employees that are protected by the fourteenth amendment.'
Roth concerned a professor who was hired for a one-year term to
teach at a state college; he had neither tenure nor a contractual
right to continued employment. Following the Board of Regents'
decision not to renew his contract for the following school year,
Roth brought a section 19836 action alleging infringement of lib-
erty and property interests. The Supreme Court held that to have
a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment a
"legitimate claim of entitlement" to the teaching position must
exist.7 Regarding liberty interests, the Supreme Court noted that
the failure to renew a contract was not, alone, a deprivation of
liberty within the scope of the amendment. The Court added that
a showing of serious damage to an individual's standing or asso-
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
I In addition to the cases commented upon herein, see Mogle v. Sevier County School
Dist., 540 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1976); Sluder v. Dyson, No. 75-1589 (10th Cir., Aug. 9, 1976)
(Not for Routine Publication).
3 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
4 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See Shulman, Employment of Non-Tenured Faculty: Some
Implications of Roth and Sindermann, 51 DEN. L.J. 215 (1974).
5 Conceptually, these two cases have a basis in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970),
where the Court held that the requirements of procedural due process prohibited termina-
tion of welfare payments without a prior evidentiary hearing. See generally Reich,
Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245
(1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 16 infra.
408 U.S. at 577.
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ciations in the community, or to an individual's opportunity to
gain further employment was required to prove the violation of a
liberty interest.'
In Sindermann, a companion case, the Court attempted to
define further the parameters of protected property interests.
Sindermann arose out of a Board of Regents' decision not to
renew the contract of Robert Sindermann, who had taught at
various state colleges for ten years, the last four of which had been
at a junior college under a series of one-year contracts. The college
had no formal provision for tenure; however it had established a
policy concerning the hiring of professors.' The Supreme Court
made it clear that the mere lack of a contractual or tenurial right
does not defeat an individual's property interest in his employ-
ment. The Court held that if a legitimate claim of entitlement to
continued employment existed then a proper due process hearing
must be held.'0 Additionally, the Court noted that a teacher, even
if not tenured, could not have the nonrenewal of his contract
based on exercise of first amendment freedoms."
Since 1972, courts have attempted to establish more pre-
cisely the type of liberty and property interests protected and the
manner in which that protection should be provided. When ana-
lyzing this complex problem it is important to note that courts
are generally reluctant to enter into the arena of government
personnel problems. While there is strong policy to afford a hear-
ing," the general consensus of the federal judiciary is that "the
Id. at 573.
The official publication for teachers provided:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administra-
tion of the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent
tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he
displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and
as long as he is happy in his work.
408 U.S. at 600. Furthermore, guidelines issued by the Coordinating Board of the Texas
College and University System provided some form of job tenure for teachers who had
been employed in the state school system for seven years or more. 408 U.S. at 600 & n.6.
" Id. at 601-03.
Id. at 598. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
11 Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist. R-J-1, 530 F.2d 1335, 1341 (10th Cir.
1976) (quoting Jefferies v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974);
Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003, 1007 (7th Cir. 1974)).
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federal court is not the appropriate forum to review the multitude
of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies."' 3
I. THE FACTS AND FINDINGS
A. Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385 (10th Cir. 1976)
In August, 1974, Governor Bruce King of New Mexico re-
moved John Mitchell from the Board of Regents of the Museum
of New Mexico. Mitchell had held this position since his appoint-
ment by King for a six-year term in 1971. King claimed that
Mitchell was removed for "neglect of duty and malfeasance."' 4
Mitchell alleged that the removal stemmed from an exercise of
his right of free speech. 5
Mitchell filed an action under section 1983's claiming that he
had served "faithfully, competently and with integrity" and that
the defendants had acted "willfully, maliciously, and intention-
ally" to deprive him of rights guaranteed by the first, fifth, and
fourteenth amendments. 7 The federal district court granted a
motion to dismiss, finding that Mitchell had no protected prop-
erty interest in the office, that no liberty interest had been in-
fringed, and that Mitchell's first amendment right had to be
balanced against "the state executive's interest in effectuating
his policy decisions.' 8 Mitchell appealed."
13 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349 (1976). Accord, Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d
279, 282 (6th Cir. 1976); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1976);
Kalme v. West Va. Bd. of Regents, 539 F.2d 1346, 1349 (4th Cir. 1976); Powers v. Mancos
School Dist. RE-6, 539 F.2d 38, 44 (10th Cir. 1976).
" King was acting under authority of N.M. CONST. art. 5, § 5, which provides that
the Governor "may remove any officer appointed by him for incompetency, neglect of duty
or malfeasance in office ....
"s The removal was related to a disagreement Mitchell had with King concerning who
should be elected president of the board. The removal came after Mitchell refused King's
request for his resignation. 537 F.2d at 387.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under the color of any statute. . subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States. . .to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to any party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
" 537 F.2d at 387. See note 15 supra.
"' 537 F.2d at 388.
" On appeal, Mitchell alleged that removal violated his right to free speech, and
deprived him of liberty and property without due process of law. Since the trial court had
granted defendant's motion to dismiss, on appeal the factual allegations of the complaint
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Judge Barrett wrote the opinion for the Tenth Circuit and
both Judges Breitenstein and Doyle concurred in separate opin-
ions."0 To determine the existence of a property interest, Judge
Barrett looked to New Mexico law. Analyzing the New Mexico
Supreme Court's construction of state law, the court determined
that no property interest had been created." The court went on
to hold that injury to reputation was not a sufficient deprivation
of a protected liberty interest so as to invoke due process protec-
tion.2 Finally, the court held that Mitchell's first amendment
claim was without merit since limitations on speech are permissi-
ble to protect a substantial governmental interest."
B. Weathers v. West Yuma County School District R-J-1, 530
F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1976)
Donald Weathers brought action under sections 1983 and
1985 2 seeking reversal of a federal district court decision2 1 that he
was not denied due process by the nonrenewal of his teacher's
contract. After a school board meeting in February, 1972,
had to be taken as true and all reasonable inferences had to be drawn in favor of the
complainant. Id. at 386.
" Judge Breitenstein concurred in the result, but could not concur in "much of the
supportive reasoning." Id. at 391. He took special exception to the court's reliance on Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), arguing that the court overstated that case's import. For a
discussion of Davis, see text accompanying notes 80-84 infra. In his concurring opinion,
Judge Doyle expressed similar concern about the court's reliance on Paul v. Davis and
"the apparent tendency of the [court's] opinion to expand and exalt the state's role in
defining federally protected rights." 537 F.2d at 392.
1, 537 F.2d at 390. The court relied upon the Governor's power under the New Mexico
Constitution to remove individuals from public office. Id.
22 Id. The court also held that injury to reputation was not deprivation of a protected
property interest. Id.
1 Id. at 391. The court held that the Governor could remove policymaking appointees
for political reasons, which include expressions made by the appointee in contravention
of the Governor's policy goals. Id.
' 530 F.2d at 1336. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970) provides:
[Ilf one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act
in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured
in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived
may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury
or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) is quoted in note 16 supra.
2 Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist. R-J-1, 387 F. Supp. 552 (D. Colo.
1974). After a court trial, the district judge held that Weathers had shown neither the
objective expectancy required for a property interest nor the infringement of a liberty
interest. Id. at 559-60.
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Weathers was informed by the principal that his contract might
not be renewed. At this time Weathers was given a copy of notes
taken at the meeting by the principal which stated several rea-
sons for not renewing Weathers' contract.26 At a meeting the next
day, the school board president refused to disclose the complain-
ants' identities to Weathers. In March the board voted unani-
mously not to renew Weathers' contract; no reasons were given
for nonrenewal.2 In his complaint, Weathers alleged that he was
deprived of liberty and property without due process of law and
that the board's action was arbitrary and unreasonable. 8 Weath-
ers did not allege that nonrenewal of his contract resulted from
the exercise of free speech or another constitutional right.
Judge Hill, writing for the Tenth Circuit, found that a school
board procedure concerning the manner in which citizen com-
plaints were to be handled by the board was not connected with
employment procedures in such a way as to give rise to the legiti-
mate expectancy necessary for a property interest. 2 The court
also held that evidence presented to establish foreclosure of op-
portunities for other employment was not sufficient to show the
violation of a protected liberty interest.?0 Regarding the question
of arbitrary and capricious state action, the Tenth Circuit held
that substantive due process protection was not greater than the
protection provided by procedural due process.3 Since no liberty
or property interest was found to exist, no substantive due process
protection was afforded.32
21 The copy of the note that was given to Weathers read as follows:
Swore or called a boy a bad name after the Brush game
Has too much busy work in class that doesn't figure into grade
Student prepared a 3-page assignment, handed it in and wasn't look[ed]
at
In group contest discussion, total group gets the same grade, regardless of
degree of participation by individuals.
530 F.2d at 1336 (footnote omitted).
"Id.
Id. at 1337-40.
Id. at 1338. Parental complaints regarding Weathers were not referred to the super-
intendent of schools as required by the policy. Weathers argued that the policy created
"an objective expectancy that he would not be denied renewal because of parental com-
plaints without a prior administrative effort to adjust such complaints." Id. The procedure
in question is set out in note 63 infra. Additionally, the board had a policy that it could
terminate nontenured teachers "without cause." 530 F.2d at 1338.
530 F.2d at 1339-40.
" Id. at 1340.
I d. at 1340-42.
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C. Powers v. Mancos School District RE-6, 539 F.2d 38 (10th
Cir. 1976)
Ronald Powers was a nontenured teacher employed by the
Mancos School District in Colorado. 31 In his third year of teach-
ing, Powers' principal did not recommend that his contract be
renewed and advised the school board that a better teacher could
be hired. The school board voted unanimously not to renew Pow-
ers' contract. No reasons for nonrenewal were given, nor were any
reasons ever publicly stated.3" After trial, the district court held
that Powers had not sustained the burden of showing that his
contract was not renewed for a constitutionally impermissible
reason, nor had he proven the existence of a protected liberty
interest."
Powers alleged on appeal that nonrenewal of his contract
violated his "academic freedom" as protected by the first amend-
ment, that he was deprived of liberty without due process of law,
and that he was dismissed, in part, for a constitutionally imper-
missible reason .3 No property interest, as such, was alleged.
Judge Barrett wrote the Tenth Circuit opinion, with Chief
Judge Lewis and Judge Seth concurring.37 Judge Barrett, relying
3 Absent agreement to the contrary, a teacher in Colorado does not acquire tenure
until his fourth year. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-63-112(1) (1973). In his second year of teach-
ing, Powers became President of the Mancos Education Association. The following year
he was a candidate for mayor of Mancos. 539 F.2d at 40.
3, 539 F.2d at 41.
" The lower court decisions are Powers v. Mancos School Dist. RE-6, 391 F. Supp.
322 (D. Colo. 1975) and Powers v. Mancos School Dist. RE-6, 369 F. Supp. 648 (D. Colo.
1973). The first cite is the trial court's decision to dismiss with prejudice Powers' case since
he has not sustained his burden in showing that a liberty interest had been infringed or
that his contract had not been renewed for exercise of his first amendment rights. 391 F.
Supp. at 326. The latter cite refers to the trial court's determination, upon defendant's
motion to dismiss, that Powers' claim that his first and fourteenth amendment rights had
been infringed stated a claim for which relief could be granted. 369 F. Supp. at 649.
11 Powers felt that the decision not to renew his contract was based on criticisms he
had aimed at the board, his actions while president of the local teachers' association and
his use of "Jesus Christ Superstar" as a teaching device. 539 F.2d at 43.
11 Chief Judge Lewis felt that the case presented "no new nor novel question of law"
and therefore no long dissertation was necessary. Id. at 44. Judge Seth agreed that there
was neither a liberty interest nor dismissal for a constitutionally impermissible reason,
but disagreed with Judge Barrett's analysis of the case. Judge Seth felt that since no
liberty or property interest was found, the case was well within Roth and Sindermann.
Additionally, he found the trial court's decision that the nonrenewal of Powers' contract
was not in response to exercise of Powers' first amendment rights was supported by the
record. Id. at 45.
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on Weathers, decided that no protected liberty interest existed,
and upheld the trial court's determination that Powers had failed
to prove he was dismissed for exercising first amendment rights. 8
D. Prebble v. Brodrick, 535 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1976)
Billy Prebble was informed during his third year as a profes-
sor at the University of Wyoming that he had not been awarded
tenure, and therefore, according to university policy, had a final
year in which to seek other employment. Prebble apparently
missed some eight days of teaching during the fall semester of his
final year, and in January, 1973, he was conditionally relieved of
all teaching duties for the spring semester. At that time the dean
of the college where Prebble taught recommended to the presi-
dent of the university that Prebble be terminated. A hearing was
held before the Tenure and Promotion Committee in February,
1973. There was some dispute concerning the procedures followed
at this hearing, but Prebble was afforded an opportunity to ex-
plain his absences on the days in question. Prebble asserted that
he "taught every class, although he was physically absent"' 9 at
times due either to job interviewing or to elk hunting.
At trial Prebble contended that he was discharged for exer-
cising his first amendment rights of free speech and association. 0
Additionally, he alleged that the procedures used at the hearing
did not meet the requirements of procedural due process." A jury
returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants. On appeal,
Prebble claimed that certain procedures at the trial level were
handled incorrectly 2 and that the proof clearly demonstrated
that he was denied due process at the hearing. Further, he argued
that he was terminated for the exercise of first amendment rights.
3' Id. at 42-43.
535 F.2d at 608.
Prebble alleged that his support of a department head who was about to be re-
placed, his outspokenness at faculty meetings, and his different teaching philosophies
were the reason for his dismissal. Id. at 609.
" Prebble objected to the fact that at the hearing he was neither given the names of
students whose statements were used as a basis for his dismissal nor permitted to cross-
examine them. Id. at 616.
12 Prebble argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the case against the univer-
sity, in directing a verdict for the trustees, in submitting an interrogatory on "neglect of
duty," in placing the burden of showing malice and lack of good faith on him, and in
selecting the verdict form. Id. at 609.
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Assuming the existence of a property interest,'3 the Tenth
Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Holloway, looked to the
issue of what process was due. The court found that Prebble had
been given notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard."
Possible objections to the hearing procedures were not persuasive
because Prebble personally had admitted the absences which
formed the basis for the discharge." Further, the court held that
Prebble had not carried the burden of proving that he was dis-
charged for exercising first amendment rights."
II. PROPERTY INTERESTS
A. Existence of Property Interests
Property interests arise not only from the traditional con-
cepts of property but also from legitimate claims of entitlement.,'
An entitlement may take the form, for example, of a lawyer's
license or a social security pension."8 To be protected by proce-
dural due process, an entitlement must be more than a mere
subjective expectancy in the mind of the claiming party; instead,
there must be a reasonable expectation to the entitlement."
When a claimed property interest is outside the scope of
"traditional property," the inquiry focuses upon the existence of
"rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
'3 The court assumed this point because it was not briefed. Id. at 614. The theory is
that since the teacher is hired for the school year, he thus has a legitimate expectancy
that he would complete the year. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77
(1972); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952); Jefferies v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974).
" 535 F.2d at 616.
SId.
A Id. at 617.
,T Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
' See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8
(1970); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
" Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972); Kota v. Little, 473 F.2d 1, 3 (4th
Cir. 1973). In determining the presence of an expectancy, no distinction may be drawn
between a right and a privilege. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). Accord Elrod
v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). But see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 353 n.4
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) where the dissent notes: "[Tihe Court's approach is a
resurrection of the discredited rights/privileges distinction, for a State may now avoid all
due process safeguards attendant upon the loss of even the necessities of life . . . merely
by labelling them as not constituting property." Id.
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support claims of entitlement to those benefits."50 These rules or
understandings must find a basis in some source independent of
the Constitution, such as state law.
51
To determine if a property interest existed in Mitchell, the
Tenth Circuit looked to the applicable state law as construed by
the New Mexico Supreme Court. The Tenth Circuit relied heav-
ily upon State ex rel. Ulrick v. Sanchez5 which held that the
Governor had the power to remove government officials ap-
pointed for a term of years. 3 The Tenth Circuit used this case as
the basis for deciding that under New Mexico law Mitchell, like
the government employees in Ulrick, could be removed at the
discretion of the Governor.
In interpreting Ulrick, the New Mexico Supreme Court had
said that when the Governor, as head of the executive branch,
assigns a reason for his action which is within the purview of the
New Mexico Constitution, that statement of reasons is conclusive
upon the courts.5 Essentially, the New Mexico court saw the
issue as one of separation of powers. Although action by the exec-
utive branch of a state government may be binding on that state's
judicial branch, that action is not binding on a federal court."
" Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
" Id. Accord, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); Gotkin v. Miller, 514 F.2d
125, 128 (2d Cir. 1975). Bishop v. Wood involved a police officer who was dismissed for
cause. In the ordinance providing for dismissal for cause, certain procedures were outlined
which the city manager had to follow. The majority of the Court held that these proce-
dures determined the extent of the property interest involved. 426 U.S. at 344-45. In
dissent, Justice White argued that this view was incompatible with Roth, and having
granted a petitioner a right to his job unless there is cause to fire him, "it is the Federal
Constitution, not state law, which determines the process to be applied in connection with
any state decision to deprive him of it." Id. at 360-61. Further, he noted that the Court
had rejected the majority view in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). In a separate
dissent, Justice Brennan asserted that there was a federal dimension to a property right.
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 353. He also read Roth as not limiting the "independent
source" of property rights to state laws. Id.
52 32 N.M. 265, 255 P. 1077 (1927).
53 Id. at 291, 255 P. at 1087.
" In a subsequent case, Ulrick was cited for the proposition that the right to hold
public office is not a property right. Montoya v. McManus, 68 N.M. 381, 385, 362 P.2d
771, 774 (1961). It is unlikely after Roth and Sindermann whether such a proposition,
without more, could suffice to explain whether a reasonable expectation to entitlement
existed. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972).
Hutchens v. Jackson, 37 N.M. 325, 336-37, 23 P.2d 355, 365-66 (1933) (interpreting
N.M. CONST. art. 3, § 1).




The executive department of a state is not a coequal of the federal
judiciary and the federal judiciary is not bound by state executive
action. Since the ascription of reasons by the Governor is not
binding upon a federal court, in theory such a court is not pre-
cluded from finding a property interest in this situation.57
In a federal court, not bound by state executive action, the
determination of what construction of state law to apply might
focus upon whether a New Mexico court, without the limitations
imposed by separation of powers, would find a property interest.
In this context Eyring v. Board of Regents" may limit Ulrick. In
Eyring, the New Mexico Supreme Court construed a state statute
providing that a university president could only be removed "for
cause." The court held that the statute required formal charges
to be made and opportunity to be heard afforded. Failure to fol-
low these procedures voided an attempted removal. 9 Mitchell
also concerned the dismissal of a public official "for cause."
Therefore, in theory, under Eyring Mitchell should have been
formally charged and given an opportunity to be heard.
B. Effect of Policymaking Official Status
In Mitchell, the Tenth Circuit drew a distinction between
employees in policymaking positions and employees mainly in-
volved in day-to-day administrative activities of a government
agency. 0 The fact that an individual occupies a policymaking
position does not necessarily preclude a finding that he has a
protected property interest in continued employment.' However,
an executive, at least arguably, should have more power to re-
move employees in policymaking positions than he has with re-
spect to general employees, because making policy is one of the
functions and responsibilities of the executive. 2 The Tenth Cir-
'" However, the argument could be made that because the federal court must define
the property interest in terms of state law, the federal court should bind itself as would
the state court. It seems more likely that a federal court would not find itself so precluded.
See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
" 59 N.M. 3, 277 P.2d 550 (1954).
" Id. at 8, 277 P.2d at 552-53.
537 F.2d at 391.
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976).
62 The theory is that the Governor is responsible for the executive function and so
those who exercise similar functions should be responsible to the executive. Conversely,
the six-year term of museum regents theoretically might operate as a limit on the exercise
of executive power. Similarly, a "for cause" provision may have the same purpose.
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cuit did not make an in-depth analysis of this issue; rather, it
merely stated that policymaking appointees could be removed by
the Governor for political reasons, and that notice or a hearing
was not required." The court failed to discuss whether the term-
of-years provision or the "for cause" provision created a restric-
tion on the Governor's powers sufficient to create a reasonable
expectancy amounting to a protected property interest.
C. The Effect of Additional Procedures
A government may be able to dismiss an employee without
affording him procedural safeguards, but once such procedures
are established, they must be followed." In Weathers it was
argued that a school board policy concerning the handling of
complaints" gave Weathers the expectancy that those procedures
would be followed. Weathers argued that this expectancy rose to
the level of a protected property interest and the failure of the
" 537 F.2d at 391. The Governor's power to remove for political reasons "encompasses
removal for expressions made by the appointee in contravention of the policy goals of the
governor." Id.
" The theory is that once procedures are established, they raise an expectation that
the procedures will be followed. This expectation creates a property right that cannot be
taken without due process of law. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v.
Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
The procedure reads as follows:
Individuals or groups often confront a single board member with issues
which usually should be handled by the Superintendent of Schools. In those
instances of apparent exception, it is suggested that the board member with-
hold an expression of opinion or commitment until the matter has been
presented to the Board of Education. It is often wise for the board member
to postpone the formulation of his own opinion until he has had the benefit
of hearing the issue discussed by the Board of Education where other aspects
of the problem are considered. A board member should not obligate other
members of the Board of Education by predicting how they will vote on any
issue.
In carrying out the policy for the handling of complaints the Board will,
therefore, observe the following procedure. Neither the Board of Education
as a unit nor any individual member will entertain or consider communica-
tion or complaints from teachers, parents, or patrons, until they have first
been referred to the Superintendent of Schools. Only in those instances
where satisfactory adjustment cannot be made by the Superintendent and
his assistants, shall communications and complaints be referred to the
Board. After hearing evidence submitted by the Superintendent, in such
event, the Board of Education will, if it deems advisable, grant a hearing to
the parties interested. Such a hearing may be held during executive session
of the Board.
530 F.2d at 1337-38.
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school board to comply with the procedures amounted to a viola-
tion of procedural due process. 6 The Tenth Circuit found that the
procedure was not related to decisions as to whether an individual
would be rehired, nor did it involve in any way the rehiring pro-
cess."7 Furthermore, the court stated that a "without cause"
clause in Weathers' contract negated any objective expectancy
that such procedure would be followed exclusively. 8
III. LIBERTY INTEREST
Due process also protects against state deprivation of liberty
interests. The initial criterion for judging whether a protected
liberty interest exists was stated in Roth: "Where a person's good
name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of what
the government is doing to him, notice and opportunity to be
heard are essential." 9 The Court in Roth made it clear that a
government does not infringe upon a liberty interest by the mere
failure to rehire an employee. 0 The Court focused on two basic
areas for determining the scope of protected liberty interests: the
protection of good name, reputation, honor or integrity; and the
ability to take advantage of other employment opportunities.7'
A. Foreclosure of Employment Opportunities
It is difficult to ascertain the standard that should be applied
to determine whether future employment opportunities have
been so impaired as to constitute infringement of a protected
liberty interest. In Roth, the Court felt that "[m]ere proof, for
example, that his [petitioner's] record of nonretention in one
job, taken alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to
some other employers would hardly establish the kind of foreclo-
sure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation of 'liberty.' "72
" The argument was that since the prescribed procedures were not followed, action
by the board in contravention of this policy would be void. See id. at 1338.
7 Id.
U Id. The talisman "without cause" seems to serve the function of negating any
procedures established. Although this concept may not be necessary to the analysis in
Weathers, the court seems to indicate that a gcvernmental agency may negate any proce-
dure established-no matter how essential to the decision involved-by merely ascribing
the term "without cause" to a contract. This seems a dangerous and unnecessary exten-
sion.
" 408 U.S. at 573 (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
408 U.S. at 573.
I ld.
12 Id. at 574 n.13.
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The concern is with the type of "stigma" which would seriously
damage the opportunity to obtain other employment."3 From this
stigma, a tangible loss of liberty may be implied. 4 The Tenth
Circuit in Weathers adopted a "practical test" to determine
whether a stigma of sufficient magnitude resulted from the gov-
ernment's action.15 This test looks not only to whether the charges
are of the type that would likely stigmatize someone but also to
whether an individual's opportunity for future employment has,
in fact, been foreclosed. In this context, evidence of attempts to
obtain other employment becomes important."
While reiterating the principle that mere proof of nonrenewal
was insufficient to invoke the protection of procedural due pro-
cess, the Tenth Circuit in Weathers clarified the extent of foreclo-
sure necessary to violate a liberty interest. The court held that
more than a "disadvantage in obtaining other employment"
must be shown; instead, the plaintiff must show the type of
stigma that seriously damages the opportunity for other employ-
ment.'
The difficulty with a practical test for determining whether
opportunities are so foreclosed as to give rise to a protected liberty
11 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Cato v. Collins, 539 F.2d 656, 659
(8th Cir. 1976); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th
Cir. 1975); Brouillette v. Board of Directors of Merged Area IX, 519 F.2d 126, 127 (8th
Cir. 1975); Lake Michigan College Fed'n of Teachers v. Lake Michigan Community Col-
lege, 518 F.2d 1091, 1096 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976); Buhr v. Buffalo
Pub. School Dist. No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir. 1974); Abeyta v. Town of Taos,
499 F.2d 323, 327 (10th Cir. 1974).
" See Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 365 (9th Cir. 1976).
, 530 F.2d at 1339. See also LaBorde v. Franklin Parish School Bd., 510 F.2d 590 (5th
Cir. 1975); Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974); Blair v. Board of
Regents, 496 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1974); Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487
F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1973); Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972). But see
Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974).
,1 Theoretically, a demonstration that a significant number of job opportunities had
been foreclosed and that this was directly related to the reasons for termination of the
employee would give rise to an inference that a protected liberty interest had been in-
fringed.
530 F.2d at 1339.
Id. See Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803 (9th Cir.
1975). The court in Weathers held that the evidence of two unsuccessful attempts to
obtain other employment was insufficient to demonstrate an infringement of a liberty
interest in theory or in fact. 530 F.2d at 1339. Drawing upon the Weathers precedent the
court in Powers accented the fact that no reasons were given to Powers for his nonrenewal.
This arguably made the claim less substantial than the one made in Weathers where the
reasons were "not substantial" or "denied or explained." 539 F.2d at 42-43.
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interest centers upon the fact that the evidence of foreclosure will
generally be available only after-often a long time after-the
nonrenewal of the employment contract. If this evidence is suffi-
cient to require a due process hearing, the fact that the hearing
must necessarily be held some time after the nonrenewal could
work a hardship for either side of the controversy. Under some
circumstances it may become impossible to provide a full due
process hearing because a requisite element of due process is that
the hearing be held at a meaningful time,79 and this may be
impossible under the circumstances. On the other hand, the
practical test more closely reflects actual events, which is in line
with the theory that due process must be flexible in order to
protect the individual. 0
B. Protection for Good Name, Reputation, Honor, and Integrity
In Paul v. Davis' the Supreme Court narrowed the area of
due process protection against government infringement of a per-
son's good name or reputation. The case concerned the distribu-
tion by police of a notice to local merchants identifying Davis as
a "known shoplifter."" The Court, over a vigorous dissent, held
that although a "classic case of defamation" had been estab-
lished,83 defamation was not sufficient to invoke the guarantees
of procedural due process "absent an accompanying loss of gov-
ernment employment.
84
Paul v. Davis is the basis of the Tenth Circuit's discussion
of liberty interests in Mitchell. The court ignores the distinction
made in Davis between injury to reputation and injury to reputa-
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McGrath, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
" Davis was arrested and charged with shoplifting. He pleaded not guilty and the
case was filed away with leave to reinstate, which left the charge outstanding. Subse-
quently, the police distributed the flyer and shortly afterwards the shoplifting charge was
dropped. Id. at 695-96.
'0 Id. at 697.
" Id. at 706. The case did not deal with the problem of remarks which might cause
harm to reputation made in connection with the nonrenewal or firing of an individual. Id.
at 709. The Supreme Court went on to note that an injury to reputation which is uncon-
nected with government employment or which does not deprive an individual of a right
previously held under state law is protected by state tort law and is not a protected interest
under the Federal Constitution. Id. at 712.
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tion when it relates to government employment.8 5 Arguably,
Mitchell's stature as a nonsalaried policymaking official altered
his status as a mere government "employee," and made him more
susceptible to an injury to reputation. The court, however, by
failing to make the injury-related-to-employment distinction
does not reach this question.
The Tenth Circuit relied on Adams v. Walkere6 as additional
support for its finding that no violation of Mitchell's liberty had
occurred. In Adams the Seventh Circuit held that "use of the
talismanic phrase 'incompetence, neglect of duty and malfeas-
ance in office' in effecting the plaintiff's discharge was plainly to
satisfy the state Constitution and did not take liberty without due
process of law." 7 The Tenth Circuit applied this idea to Governor
King's use of the phrase "neglect of duty and malfeasance." The
phrase was the official basis for removing Mitchell from the
Board of Regents and served merely as the means by which King
satisfied the New Mexico Constitution. By using the phrase King
was able to remove Mitchell without infringing upon a protected
property interest.8 Furthermore, no liberty interest was infringed
" The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Davis must be read in light of the separate
concurring opinions of Judges Breitenstein and Doyle which limit the sweep of the court's
opinion, especially since Judge Barrett expressed agreement with Judge Breitenstein's
analysis of Davis. 537 F.2d at 392. Referring to a footnote in Davis, Judge Breitenstein
noted that section 1983 protects not only against governmental actions which deprive an
individual of rights having a genesis in state law, but also protects those interests guaran-
teed by the Bill of Rights. Id. at 391-92. Judge Doyle expressed similar concern in "the
apparent tendency of the opinion to expand and exalt the state's role in defining federally
protected rights." Id. at 392.
None of the opinions in Mitchell refers to the distinction drawn in other circuits
between injury to reputation alone and the same injury when connected with employment.
Huntley v. Community School Bd., 543 F.2d 979, 985 (2d Cir. 1976); Colaizzi v. Walker,
542 F.2d 969, 973-74 (7th Cir. 1976); Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361,
365 (9th Cir. 1976).
- 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974). In Adams, the Governor of Illinois removed a member
of the Liquor Control Commission for "cause" and "for incompetence, neglect of duty and
malfeasance." Id. at 1004.
,1 Id. at 1007. The charge made in Adams was considered to have less effect upon an
individual's freedom to secure other employment than allegations relating to immorality
or dishonesty. Id. at 1008. Judge, now Justice, Stevens in his concurring opinion counseled
that the concept of "malfeasance" depends upon its context. Id. at 1010.
m If Governor King had removed Mitchell without using this phrase he would have
infringed a protected property interest because Mitchell had a legitimate expectancy that
he would not be removed from his position absent "neglect of duty and malfeasance." See
text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
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since in that context the words used have no further meaning and
no inference can be drawn to reflect upon Mitchell's good name.89
As a result of the Tenth Circuit's application of Adams in
Mitchell, words that would normally result in the infringement
of a liberty interest (because of their opprobrious meaning to the
community at large) do not do so because of the context in which
they are used. The words must be used to avoid violation of a
property interest.
C. Disclosure
An accusation that would injure a person's good name would
probably also lessen or foreclose his opportunities to find other
employment, especially when these reasons are disclosed to the
public or prospective employers. That disclosure is a crucial fact
where liberty interests are concerned was illustrated by the recent
case of Bishop v. Wood,9" where the Supreme Court held that
false reasons can be the basis for discharge or nonrenewal as long
as they are not broadcast.' Similarly, the Second Circuit has held
that the manner in which personnel records were disclosed, cou-
pled with procedures whereby employees were given neither rea-
sons for dismissal nor hearings, encouraged the very harm that
Roth and Sindermann meant to prevent.2
Since disclosure problems do not occur until the state has in
Arrelano v. Lopez, 81 N.M. 389, 391-92, 467 P.2d 715, 717 (1970). See Adams v.
Walker, 492 F.2d 1003, 1015 (7th Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion). It should be noted that
the New Mexico Supreme Court has determined malfeasance to be something done wholly
wrongfully or without authority. Additionally, if an act is discretionary, it needs to be done
with an improper or corrupt motive. This definition does not affect the finding of a liberty
interest since that is defined by context of federal constitutional law. Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975). Accord Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 355 (1976) (White, J., dissenting);
Thurston v. Deckle, 531 F.2d 1264, 1271 (5th Cir. 1976).
-0 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
" Id. at 348.
," Velger v. Cawley, 525 F.2d 334, 337 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 427 U.S. 904
(1976). Retired Justice Tom Clark, sitting by designation, wrote for the court:
The appellees could change their disclosure procedures to prevent the dis-
semination of derogatory and possibly stigmatizing allegations unless notice
of the charges and a hearing are first afforded to the dischargee. Otherwise,
rudimentary procedural due process requires that such notice of charges and
a hearing be afforded before a dismissal can be effective.
525 F.2d at 337. See Cato v. Collins, 539 F.2d 656, 659 (8th Cir. 1976); Greenhill v. Bailey,
519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975); Buhr v. Buffalo Pub. School Dist. No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196, 1199
(8th Cir. 1974).
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some way published the reasons for nonrenewal, 3 in theory, a
hearing may be required where one would not be absent disclo-
sure. This results from the fact that disclosure might injure the
employee's reputation or foreclose other job opportunities. Again,
the hearing might not be held for some time after the alleged
incidents occurred, harming either or both parties. Even though
the disclosed reasons are not of the type which would normally
be considered stigmatizing, the fact that these reasons may be
false could be sufficient to require a hearing. 4
There are, however, limitations on the protection afforded
after disclosure. If the reasons for nonrenewal of a contract are
disclosed after an injury to reputation has allegedly occurred,
those reasons cannot serve retroactively to support the claim. 5
Furthermore, the reasons disclosed at a public hearing held on
the request of the person cannot serve as a basis for a claim.
In Powers, where no reasons had been disclosed for the nonre-
newal of the plaintiffs contract, the court had the opportunity to
discuss whether some future disclosure of a stigmatizing nature
would be grounds for a hearing. The court decided that there was
no need for a predisclosure hearing,97 but did not address the
question of whether a hearing should be held on disclosure of the
stigmatizing reasons, or in what circumstances a hearing would
be appropriate. In Weathers, the court looked to the reasons that
were given for nonrenewal, and, although they were either ex-
plained or denied, held that a due process hearing was not re-
" See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 352 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" This could be likely when specific factual incidents or objective characteristics are
the basis for not renewing a contract or firing an employee, rather than some subjective
conclusion as to the ability of an individual. See Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 8 (8th
Cir. 1975) (hearing required where denigration of ability and not just performance); Lake
Michigan College Fed'n of Teachers v. Lake Michigan Community College, 518 F.2d 1091,
1096 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976) (hearing required where honesty or
integrity is at question); Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974) (charge
of mental instability grounds for a hearing); McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 319-20 (4th
Cir. 1973) (accusation of fraud impinged upon a liberty interest). But see Stretten v.
Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 363 (9th Cir. 1976) (incompetence not suffi-
cient); Blair v. Board of Regents, 496 F.2d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 1974) (failure to meet
minimum standards not sufficient).
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976).
" Cato v. Collins, 539 F.2d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 1976).
,7 539 F.2d at 42.
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quired since the plaintiff had not demonstrated the stigmatizing
nature of the charges."
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Due process as embodied in the fourteenth amendment pro-
vides not only procedural protection of individual rights against
governmental intrusion but substantive protection as well. Ac-
cording to one theory, substantive due process is a specific consti-
tutional protection in itself, provided by the fourteenth amend-
ment, and is invoked when the government acts in an arbitrary
and capricious manner.99 The more predominant theory is that
substantive due process protection is conditioned on the infringe-
ment of a specific constitutional right. 00 In the latter case, the
rights protected are not confined to those enumerated in the Bill
of Rights. 10
A. Substantive Due Process as a Constitutional Right of Its
Own Accord
In Weathers and Powers, the Tenth Circuit faced the ques-
tion of whether substantive due process operates as a constitu-
tional restriction in its own right on arbitrary and capricious state
action. In Weathers, the court adopted the view that substantive
due process does not afford more protection than that provided
by procedural due process.0 2 The basic rationale behind this view
was expressed by Judge, now Justice, Stevens in the following
manner: "[C]ertainly the constitutional right to substantive due
process is no greater than the right to procedural due process.
Accordingly, the absence of any claim by the plaintiff that an
" Id.
At one time, substantive due process by itself was thought to be a strong source of
protection against the intrusion by the government into economic affairs. Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Supreme Court, however, later adopted the present view
that such regulations are valid if reasonably related to valid legislative purposes. West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist.,
451 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1971).
11 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 n.5 (1976); Mescia v. Berry; 406 F. Supp. 1181,
1194 (D.S.C. 1974).
"I St. Ann v. Palisi, 495 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court has
extended the scope of specific constitutional rights to include such things as the right to
travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and the right to privacy, Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring).
"2 530 F.2d at 1342.
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interest in liberty or property has been impaired is a fatal defect
in her 'substantive' due process argument."'0 3 Under this view,
substantive due process protection is provided against depriva-
tions of life, liberty, or property, and, necessarily, the lack of a
liberty or property interest precludes any substantive due process
argument. Under this theory, if a state may dismiss an employee
for no reason at all and thereby prevent the expectancy required
for a property interest from arising,0 4 the state may premise its
action upon reasons unsupported by facts'' or in circumstances
where discharge of the employee "was a mistake and based on
incorrect information."'0 6 In Weathers, the Tenth Circuit found
that there was no property or liberty interest,07 and in Powers
that there was no protected liberty interest. 08 Consequently, no
substantive due process protection was available in either case.' 9
B. Substantive Due Process Protection Against an Infringement
of a Constitutional Right
Substantive due process may, however, protect against in-
fringement of a right guaranteed by the United States Constitu-
tion. Even though no cognizable property or liberty interest exists
"0 Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974). Accord
Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279, 282 (6th Cir. 1976); Buhr v. Buffalo Pub. School Dist.
No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196, 1202 (8th Cir. 1974); Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658
(7th Cir. 1974). Contra, Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106, 1108 (1st Cir.
1971), which expresses the opposing view that an individual should be protected against
arbitrary and capricious state action regardless of the property and liberty interest in-
volved.
"0' A property interest, of course, requires that an individual have a reasonable ex-
pectancy to an entitlement; if dismissal can be for no reason, it obviates such an expect-
ancy. See text accompanying notes 46-50 supra.
"I Compare Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974)
with Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106, 1108 (1st Cir. 1971).
" Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976).
101 530 F.2d at 1338-40.
1" 539 F.2d at 42-43. The court found that there was no protected liberty or property
interest although there was no allegation of infringement of a property interest. Id. at 41-
42. The finding that no property interest existed was required because of the way the court
analyzed the substantive due process issue. The court determined that if no liberty or
property interest exists, no substantive due process protection is afforded. Id. at 43.
* Essentially substantive due process, as a protection in and of itself, may not be
sufficient since a decision need not be based upon reasons supported by the facts. Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976). However, where the government discloses these unsup-
ported reasons, substantive due process may be relevant since the scope changes from
reasons for dismissal to reasons which may be considered to carry the government's asser-
tion that these facts are true. See text accompanying notes 90-94 supra.
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in the employment relationship, a state may not fire an employee
or fail to renew his contract for a constitutionally impermissible
reason-especially where first amendment rights are concerned."'
Where an employee is discharged for exercising a constitutional
right-such as a teacher speaking publicly against a school board
position"'-the action is considered arbitrary and capricious and
the employee is protected by substantive due process.2
Mitchell, Powers and Prebble all involved first amendment
claims. In Mitchell, the court held that the plaintiffs assertion
that he was dismissed for exercising his first amendment rights
was without merit,"3 and therefore no substantive due process
protection was available. The court relied upon the fact that re-
gents occupied policymaking positions, and from this reasoned
that expressions made in contravention of a policy goal set by the
Governor were within permissible grounds for removal." 4 Thus,
the political context and status of the speaker change the nature
of the protection. Arguably, then, removal was not for the expres-
sion, per se, but rather for the political differences evidenced by
those expressions.5
C. Burden of Proof
In both Powers"' and Prebble,"7 the Tenth Circuit stated
"' Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1976); Prince
v. Bridges, 537 F.2d 1269, 1272 (4th Cir. 1976); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171
(10th Cir. 1975); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th
Cir. 1975); Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974); Gieringer v. Center
School Dist. No. 58, 477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1973); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 857
(5th Cir. 1970); Comment, Teachers' Speech and First Amendment Rights, 53 DEN. L.J.
95 (1976).
"' See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com-
munity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960).
"I Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4-5 n.12 (7th Cir. 1974);
Mescia v. Berry, 406 F. Supp. 1181, 1194 (D.S.C. 1974).
537 F.2d at 391.
"' Id. See Indiana State Employees Ass'n v. Negley, 501 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1974).
"' The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, holding that attitude was insepara-
bly intertwined with protected first amendment expression, reversed a lower court deci-
sion upholding the dismissal of probationary employees based not on the statements
made, but rather on the attitude evidenced by those statements. Tygrett v. Washington,
543 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1974), revg 346 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1972).
539 F.2d at 41.
, 535 F.2d at 617.
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that the plaintiffs failed to establish the fact that they were dis-
missed for exercising their first amendment rights. The Tenth
Circuit, among others, has determined that the burden of proof
is on the plaintiff to show that he was dismissed for a constitu-
tionally impermissible reason."18 Where no claim is made that
termination was due to the exercise of a constitutional right, a
presumption of regularity cloaks official action."9 However, where
such a claim is made it must be examined to insure that the
termination of employment is not in retaliation for the exercise
of rights protected by the Constitution.'20
The Supreme Court recently indicated that where plausible
and valid claims of infringement of a constitutionally protected
interest exist, the burden of proving that nonrenewal was not
based on an impermissible reason may shift to the Govern-
ment.'2 ' In the recent case of Mt. Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle,'22 the Court addressed the problem
of whether an individual could be dismissed for reasons only some
"' Prince v. Bridges, 537 F.2d 1269, 1272 (4th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Campbell County
School Dist. No. 1, 511 F.2d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 1975); Buhr v. Buffalo Pub. School Dist.
No. 38, 509 F.2d 1196, 1203 n.8 (8th Cir. 1974); Callahan v. Price, 505 F.2d 83, 87 (5th
Cir. 1974), rehearing denied, 513 F.2d 51 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 927 (1975);
Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 339 (10th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908
(1974); Calvin v. Rupp, 471 F.2d 1346, 1350 (8th Cir. 1973); Fluker v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 441 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1971).
"I Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976). See Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495
F.2d 658, 666-68 (7th Cir. 1974) (Stevens, J., concurring); Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consol.
School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1974). But see Illinois State Employees Union v.
Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
I" Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 582 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171, 1177
(10th Cir. 1975). See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 562, 575 n.14 (1972).
' The Court has made it clear that where plausible claims of racial discrimination
in the termination of employees have been made, the burden of proof shifts to the Gov-
ernment to prove that the action was not premised on this constitutionally impermissible
reason. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209-11 (1973). See also Roper v. Ef-
fingham County Bd. of Educ., 528 F.2d 1024, 1025 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 72 (4th Cir. 1973).
In Keyes, the state was required to show that segregative intent was not among the
factors that motivated its action "to any degree." 413 U.S. at 210-11. In some cases the
clear and convincing standard has been placed on the Government to show that the
termination of a teacher was not racially motivated. McCormick v. Attala County Bd. of
Educ., 541 F.2d 1094, 1095 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Chesterfield County School
Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 72 (4th Cir. 1973). Arguably, substantive due process should be applied
to the exercise of free speech to the same extent as racial discrimination.
1 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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of which were constitutionally impermissible. The Court held
that if, without consideration of constitutionally protected ac-
tions, the individual would be terminated from employment,
then no protection is afforded.1 3 The Court stated that the bur-
den was properly placed on the claimant to demonstrate that his
conduct was protected and that this conduct was the "motivating
factor" in the decision to terminate his employment.' 4 Once a
prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the
Government to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have decided without reference to the protected
activities that the employee's contract should not be renewed., 5
The question remains, of course, what establishes the prima
facie case that shifts the burden of proof to the government?
Inquiry and proof might be quite difficult in cases like Powers
where the Tenth Circuit asserted that the exercise of Powers' first
amendment rights "was not shown to have played a part in the
Board's decision" not to renew his contract,' 6 while also stating
that no reasons have ever been stated publicly for the nonrene-
wal.'27 By not requiring some reasons to be given for the nonrene-
wal of a contract, courts place the individual in the difficult posi-
tion of ascertaining whether they have been dismissed for a con-
stitutionally impermissible reason or not.
CONCLUSION
In determining whether property interests exist, the Tenth
Circuit has looked to applicable state law. It is not clear whether
separation of powers between branches of state governments will
preclude federal courts from findings of property interests. Addi-
tionally, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that the existence of
property interests may depend upon the policymaking status of
the individuals involved. The closer the function of the individual
comes to that of the executive, the more leeway the executive will
have in removing that individual without infringing a property
interest. The court has also found that while property interests
may be created by additional procedures, in order to create the
I2 Id. at 285.
' Id. at 287.
125 Id.
539 F.2d at 43.
'" Id. at 41.
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requisite expectancy such procedures must relate in some way to
the employment process.
A liberty interest may be infringed if injury is done to an
individual's good name or if opportunity for future employment
is foreclosed as a result of some stigma that the government has
created. Injury to reputation usually must be accompanied by
some other deprivaton. In determining whether future employ-
ment has been foreclosed, the Tenth Circuit will apply a practical
test. This test depends upon an actual showing that opportunities
have been significantly lessened by what the government has said
about an individual. Additionally, where reasons for termination
of an employee are not disclosed until some time after the termi-
nation, questions arise as to whether a hearing is then required.
The Tenth Circuit has determined that, absent a finding of
a liberty or property interest, substantive due process does not
protect the individual from governmental action. Substantive
due process does protect the individual from termination for a
constitutionally impermissible reason. However, the Tenth Cir-
cuit has placed the burden of proof on the employee to demon-
strate that he was so removed.
Recent cases indicate that the Tenth Circuit echoes the gen-
eral feeling that federal courts should be reluctant to step into
intragovernmental personnel problems. A finding that some form
of due process is to be afforded, whether it be because a liberty
or property interest is involved or because of substantive due
process, would not dictate the form of the hearing. Some rudi-
mentary form of due process would provide a more appropriate
forum than the court's to air personnel grievances, serve as an
incentive to employers to more fully analyze their decision, amel-
iorate any problems that future disclosure might present, and
focus and illuminate any problems that will require further court
action.
Stephen M. Flavin
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